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INVESTING IN THE DRAGON: MANAGING THE PATENT
VERSUS TRADE SECRET PROTECTION DECISION FOR
THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION IN CHINA
Robert Bejeskyt
I. INTRODUCTION
The global dependencies that exist in today's high technology
world require that the value of intellectual property (IP)l be protected.
Most believe that granting a monopoly right2 to the pecuniary benefits
accruing from an invention will motivate entrepreneurs to innovate
new products3  and stimulate aggregate international economic
progress.4 From a competitive transnational business perspective,
protecting the value of IP is important to both the individual firm that
'Adjunct Professor, Thomas M. Cooley Law School; Assistant Professor, College
of Business, Central Michigan University; Adjunct Professor, Political Science
Department, Alma College; Ph.D. Candidate, University of Michigan; MA.E.,
University of Michigan; LL.M., Georgetown Law School; J.D., Cooley Law School;
B.B.A., Saginaw Valley State University. The author would like to thank Cara
Collinson, Richard Skeen, and the rest of the Journal staff for their excellent work in
preparing this article for publication.
1. Throughout this Article, when the term "IP" is employed, it will refer specifically
to patents and trade secrets. However, in many cases, the term could potentially be
employed more generally to refer to all types of IP.
2. See Christopher R. Perry, Trademarks As Commodities: The "Famous"
Roadblock to Applying Trademark Dilution Law in Cyberspace, 32 CONN. L. REV.
1127, 1138 (2000).
3. Peter K Yu, Toward a Nonzero-Sum Approach to Resolving Global Intellectual
Property Disputes: What We Can Learn From Mediators, Business Strategists, and
International Relations Theorists, 70 U. C1N. L. REV. 569, 650 (2002).
4. Richard J. Ansson, Jr., International Intellectual Property Rights, The United
States, and the People s Republic of China, 13 TEMP. INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 1, 1 (1999).
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holds those rights5 and to the parent country's exports in service-
focused and technology-dominant economies of the world.! Given the
national economic interest involved,7  technologically abundant
countries have pressed for enhanced IP protections globally.' This is
because inventions often first actualize in these countries9 and
5. Peter J. Wied, Patently Unfair: State Unfair Competition Laws and Patent
Enforcement, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 469, 469 (1999); see generally William P. Alford,
Intellectual in East Asia: How Theory Does - And Does Not - Matter: American
Approaches to Intellectual Property Law in East Asia, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 8, 9
(1994).
6. Trade in services accounts for two-thirds of U.S. GNP. See generally RALPH H.
FOLSOM ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 268 (2d ed. 2001). Imports
and other balance of payment debit items must be paid for by purchasing the foreign
currency of the exporting country. See generally Balance of Payments, BIZ/ED, at
http://www.bized.ac.uk/stafsup/options/notes/ econ218.htm (last visited Mar. 22,
2004). IP-annexed exports or receipt of licensing fees are credits that offset debit
items. Id. In service dominant countries, such as the United States, this accounting
item is very important since imports would need to be paid for by increasing taxes or
by financing deficits. History has exhibited that countries first build their economies
by industrialization and often accumulate wealth by exporting of goods from that
industrialization. This is called "export-led" development. However, the development
process eventually results in shifting industrial production to where labor rates are
lower and where regulatory frameworks may be more amenable to higher levels of
industrialization. Shifting dominant production, in the general temporal order in
which it has occurred, has gone from Western Europe, United States, Japan, the
Asian Tigers, and then to China. In the countries where there is a shift moderately
away from manufacturing, service-oriented and technology-based industries attain
increasing importance for the economy and global competition. Technological
innovations as a percentage of the economy can even sometimes be classified as a
hybrid between service and manufacturing sectors since expenditures on research
and design are derived from the value placed on intellectual thought as applied to
tangible goods.
7. Some technology abundant countries have noted the vital importance of global
IP right protections and developed national IP strategies. Zenta Senoo, The State of
Intellectual Property Strategy, 21 J. JAPANESE TRADE & INDUS. 38, 38 (2002).
8. Maureen A. O'Rourke, Toward A Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1203 (2000).
9. See Alan S. Gutterman, The North-South Debate Regarding the Protection of
Intellectual Property Rights, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 89, 89 (1993). Developed
nations have a comparative advantage in technology and have favored stronger
intellectual property rules, while developing countries have tended to favor weaker
protections for intellectual property; see also Evelyn Su, The Winners and the Losers
of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and its
Effects on Developing Countries, 23 Hous. J. INT'L L. 169 (2000).
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traverse sovereign borders by the initiative of multinational
corporations (MNCs). 1"
Countries disagree about the appropriate level of IP protection
because of varying stages of economic development" and divergent
interests. Safeguarding IP is a function of territorial jurisdiction and
sovereign prerogative. The persona of the law and enforcement of the
law can be impacted by factors such as economic development,
political history, ideology, and culture within a country.12  Even
among technologically abundant countries, there is discord regarding
the appropriate broadness and standards for IP protection rules and
definitions due to cultural distinctions." However, there is an even
greater disparity between the levels of IP right protections of the
technologically advanced and developing economies of the world.
A company assumes more investment risk and volatility when
investing in an emerging economy than when investing in a developed
market economy." However, a government that upholds IP rights
displays a signaling indicator to potential investors that the
government recognizes the private sector's preference in making
business decisions with few government impediments1 and within a
more transparent regulatory framework," therefore decreasing risk of
IP value loss. Governments that provide this perception rouse foreign
10. See generally Susan K Sell, Multinational Corporations as Agents of Change:
The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights, in PRIVATE AUTHORITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 169 (A. Claire Cutler et al. eds., 1999).
11. Generally, property right protections are often weaker in emerging markets than
in developed markets. See T.G. Rowski, Chinese Industrial Reform:
Accomplishments, Prospects and Implications, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 271 (1994).
12. Susan Tiefenbrun, Piracy of Intellectual Property in China and the Former Soviet
Union and its Effects Upon International Trade: A Comparison, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 1
(1998).
13. Michael North, The U.S. Expansion of Patentable Subject Matter: Creating a
Competitive Advantage for Foreign Multinational Companies?, 18 B.U. INT'L L.J. 111,
112 (2000); see also Samson Helfgott, Cultural Differences Between the U.S. and
Japanese Patent Systems, 72 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 231, 231 (1990).
14. See M.W. PENG, BUSINESS STRATEGIES IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES (2000).
15. See generally ROBERT M. SHERWOOD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 269-70 (1990).
16. See China Briefing, FAR E. ECON. REV., Dec. 26, 2002. The U.S. Trade
Representative noted China's significant process in fortifying the rule of law its first
year in the WTO, but the most pressing concerns still include lack of transparency in
new rule frameworks and IP rights. Id.
2004] 439
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investment within their respective jurisdictions." A crucial issue
among foreign investment entrepreneurs is how companies should
value risk of high technology investment in the developing world as
compared to that of more developed markets.'
This article considers two factors related to this risk in the
context of China associated with the global importance of this market
and serious apprehensions encompassing China's IP right
protections.' 9 First, it considers objective enforcement of codified legal
institutions" that protect patents and trade secrets while examining
political, cultural, and informal" influences on legal frameworks.
MNCs often must negotiate with government officials and build
political relationships in the investee country.2 Second, within the
context of dynamic interactions between political and legal influences,
the article appraises the important trade-off between filing for patent
protection or protecting process technology internally via trade
17. See F.M. Ross Armbrecht, WTO Entry, Government's Welcome Could Spur
Foreign R&D in China, 45 RES. TECH. MGMT. 2 (2002).
18. Pressing risks include: political risks, country and industry-sector risks,
environmental and obsolescence risks, transparency risks, and currency risks. See
generally Christian Leuz et al., Investor Protection and Earnings Management: An
International Comparison, BATTEN BRIEFINGS: VALUATION IN EMERGING MARKETS,
BATTEN BRIEFINGS, Apr. 2002, available at http://www.darden.virginia.edu/
batten.vem/PDFs/Wysockipaperfinal.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2004); see also Sandeep
A. Patel et al., Measuring Transparency and Disclosure at Firm-level in Emerging
Markets, BATTEN BRIEFINGS: VALUATION IN EMERGING MARKETS, May 2002, available
at http://www.darden.virginia.edulbatten.vem/PDFs/Patelpaperfinal.pdf (last visited
Mar. 12, 2004). At the essence of a foreign entrepreneurial venture that relies on
technology as a large percentage of asset value is the extent to which the local
country's legal system can efficiently and transparently protect investments.
19. IP protection has become one of the most prominent concerns for those seeking
economic integration into China. Daniel C.K. Chow, Enforcement Against
Counterfeiting in the People 's Republic of China, 20 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BuS. 447, 448
(2000). While the article focuses on China, it does have broader geographic scope,
such as for most developing countries where adequate IP rights protections are
suspect. See id.
20. 'Institutions," throughout the paper, refer both to codified law and regulatory
frameworks that provide substantive parameters for proper societal conduct and to
government institutions that have the authority to enforce that substantive law.
21. All three of these terms have been employed by various authors to depict
informal norms of societal behavior or government action outside the legal system in
China. For simplicity, this article will primarily use the term "political."
22. See Jean J. Boddewyn & Thomas L. Brewer, International-Business Political
Behavior: New Theoretical Directions, 19 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 119 (1994).
[Vol. 11:2
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secret. 3 This is a particularly important question since Chinese
officials are currently grappling with the issue of whether business
methods should be patentable. 4 These two questions are then applied
to the MNC's due diligence and valuation assessment process for a
foreign investment within the type of organizational investment form
appropriate for particular technology.
II. CHINA'S PROGRESS IN FORTIFYING IP PROTECTIONS
A. International Influences and Global Cooperation
In order to protect a patent, a firm must comply with filing
requirements, the invention must fall within the scope of patent
protection as defined by the host government, and the holder must
take measures to enforce patent rights if there is a potential
infringement. To protect a trade secret, suitable internal company
safeguards must be implemented to secure the secret's preservation
within the company and adequate measures must be taken to enforce
trade secret rights if there is an infringement.
Patent and trade secret protection falls within the domestic
jurisdiction of the foreign country; therefore, enforcement is
dependent on the host country's judiciary and/or executive
prerogative. Despite disparate interests, economic systems, and
levels of development among countries, the pronounced trend has
promoted and procured markedly stronger IP protections globally.
Government leaders recognize that economic globalization and
technological investment contribute to the growth of economies'
(assuming that there is a relatively inelastic supply of innovations
and a correlation between the level of economic development and the
level of technology transferred)." The desire to attain advanced
technologies has fostered much worldwide cooperation.
23. Robert C. Haldiman, Intellectual Property: Policy Considerations from a
Practitioners Perspective: Prior User Rights for Business Method Patents, 20 ST.
Louis U. PuB. L. REv. 245, 251-52 (2001).
24. Joy Y. Xiang, How Wide Should the Gate of 'echnology" Be? Patentability of
Business Methods in China, 11 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 795, 795 (2002).
25. See Gao Lulin, A Preliminary Analysis of the TRIPS Negotiations of the Uruguay
Round of GATT, CBINA PAT. & TRADEMARK, Jan. 1993.
26. This is premised on the assumption that innovations must match the
appropriate level of economic development because certain technologies can stimulate
growth in particular industries but other technologies may be less beneficial to the
economic structure of a country because the technology may not be put to a very
efficient and capable use.
20041
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. [Vol. 11:2
International influences,27  treaty-based frameworks,28  and
executive agreements29 have had a notable impact on the aggregate
value of IP assets worldwide and continue to provide more security.
Therefore, cooperative international frameworks validate and embody
long-term relationships, resulting in governments enacting domestic
institutional rule improvements and more effective enforcement of
those rules.' The most notable contention among states is how to
define and interpret acceptable rules of conduct in IP right
protections. Uncertainty for MNCs derives from the friction between
countries that rely on the rule of law to provide heightened
transparency for economic actors and those that rely more on political
will and cultural norms. Even though knowledge, creation, and
adaptation to product designs and production techniques are
universally perceived as being essential for competitiveness and
economic growth in any country, fortifying institutional protections is
27. International relation influences can include financial or moral leverage, or any
consideration that can cause a state to find that it is in its self-interest to cooperate.
See BRUCE BUENO DE MESQUITA, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: PEOPLE'S
POWER, PREFERENCES, AND PERCEPTIONS 167-95 (2d ed. 2003). International relations
and cooperation have been a politically important issue in driving global IP rights
protection. See Sumner J. La Croix & Denise Eby Konan, Intellectual Property Rights
in China: The Changing Political Economy of Chinese-American Interests, 25 WORLD
ECON. 759, 759 (2002).
28. A treaty is an international agreement between states that grants rights and
binds governments to perform obligations in a way that did not exist prior to the
treaty. See DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 25-40 (2001). The
TRIPS agreement, as part of the World Trade Organization (WTO) framework, is one
of the most influential IP right protection frameworks. This result is because of the
connection to the WTO and number of countries participating. Final Act Embodying
the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125
(1994); Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994).
29. Executive agreements are international agreements that are binding between
countries negotiated by heads of state that do not require domestic level ratification
after the signing process. See BEDERMAN, supra note 28, at 166-69.
30. See J.H. Reichman & David Lange, Bargaining Around the TRIPS Agreement:
The Case for Ongoing Public-Private Initiatives to Facilitate Worldwide Intellectual
Property Transactions, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 11 (1998).
31. See Joel W. Rogers & Joseph P. Whitlock, Is Section 337 Consistent with the
GATT and the TRIPS Agreement?, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. RLV. 459 (2002). One would
expect that enforcement mechanisms will continue to improve, but there is still a
fairly expansive disconnect between adopting new laws and enforcing those laws. Id.
at 503.
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a gradual process and one that is far from being receptive to legal
transplants from foreign sources.
International influences33 and governmental recognition that
fortify IP protection for regimes to attain better technology can beget
more pronounced economic growth and therefore, are in the self-
interest of leaders in power." However, any foreign investment with
annexed IP value must consider the dynamics of legal and
institutional change along a continuum in the investee/host country.
This is especially the case when there has been much cultural
reluctance to fully embrace Western conceptions of property rights
and when there is wealth transfer from developing to industrialized
countries." Normally, these dynamics are in the form of expatriated
MNC profits. Also, there are distinctions in the degree to which
remnants of statist governments exist and concomitant political
influences on the private sector subsist in emerging markets.3
32. Paul Edward Geller, Legal Transplants in International Copyright: Some
Problems of Method, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 199, 199-201 (1994).
33. China has had "no other choice but to establish and strengthen its intellectual
property protection system." Zheng Chengsi, The TRIPS Agreement and Intellectual
Property Protection in China, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 219, 219 (1998).
34. See J. Mark Ramseyer, Public Choice, in CHICAGO LECTURES IN LAW AND
ECONOMICS 101-11 (Eric A. Posner ed., 2000). The assumption is that leaders will
govern in a way that helps them maintain power. Id. Improvements in economic
growth will appease the populace. Id. In consolidated democracies, there is a
relatively clear nexus between constituent desires and the positions of respective
politicians since they compete in electoral markets to remain as representatives. Id.
While only having one political party in power eliminates electoral choice or debate
among policy positions, see generally Introduction, in BUILDING DEMOCRATIC
INSTITUTIONS: PARTY SYSTEMS IN LATIN AMERICA 6-20 (Scott Mainwaring & Timothy R.
Scully eds., 1995), the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) authoritarian grip on
society has slowly declined. STANLEY B. LUBMAN, Introduction: Understanding
China Through Chinese Law, in BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO
9 (1999). There has been much fragmentation and inter-unit bargaining regarding
policy proposals within the CCP. Kenneth G. Lieberthal, Introduction: The
'Fragmented Authoritarianism" Model and Its Limitations, in BUREAUCRACY,
POLITICS, AND DECISION MAKING IN POST-MAO CHINA 1 (Kenneth G. Lieberthal &
David Lampton eds., 1992). It is logical to assume that those in power in China do
react to populace desires and that unilateral guidance of the populace is not the norm
even though China is not a democracy.
35. See generally Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO TRIPS Agreement and Global
Economic Development, in PUBLIC POLICY AND GLOBAL TECHNOLOGICAL INTEGRATION
4-12 (Frederick M. Abbott & David J. Gerber eds., 1997).
36. See MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY 80-88
(1986). A statist government is one whereby private sector and government interests
are unified. Id. This has also been called an activist state. While the norm in today's
20041
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Some frame the IP rights protection issue primarily in terms of
national economic rational choice analysis: "intellectual property
pirating fuels development until the country reaches the point where
intellectual property protection becomes economically
advantageous."" While it is generally recognized that utilizing
technology in the economy may be the most important factor to foster
growth 8 (IP right protections serve as a stimulus to induce risky
ventures with high initial research and design allocations),
technologically less advanced countries are not in a strong position to
compete globally in certain industries with technologically advanced
countries. Varying levels of economic development breed dissension;
therefore, a more fortified and objectively enforced IP protection
regime will be assembled when the country can internally and
naturally accept that elevated level of protection and when it is
consistent with the economic realities of the country.39 However, the
benefits of IP protection may consistently outweigh its costs."0
Without a natural consistency between IP protections and the level of
economic development that fosters government decisiveness to protect
IP value, enforcement actions are more apt to be sporadic' and driven
by political will to provide a media perception of improvement to
international actors. Consistency and transparency in enforcement
may not exist.
capitalistic world has been that of decentralizing government and promoting a
relatively more laissez-faire private sector, there are still exceptions. Along with
China, Japan would also be a relatively good example of a statist government. PETER
J. KATZENSTEIN, Conclusion: Domestic Structure and Strategies of Foreign Policy, in
BETWEEN POWER AND PLENTY 297-333 (Peter J. Katzenstein ed., 1977).
37. Stephan Kirchanski, Protection of U.S. Patent Rights in Developing Countries:
U.S. Efforts to Enforce Pharmaceutical Patents in Thailand, 16 Loy. L.A. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 569, 598 (1994).
38. See generally RICHARD R. NELSON, THE SOURCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH (1996).
39. On the one hand, one can reason that fortifying IP rights is a natural
progression of an economy that is becoming more dominated by market dynamics. As
a higher percentage of an economy is identified as consisting of privately held
production entities, the greater should be the move toward fortifying legal
institutions for property rights in items that were previously publicly held property.
IP is just another form of property, but it is a form of property with varying
comparative rule and enforcement interpretations, especially over how rules can best
stimulate economic development.
40. Kirchanski, supra note 37, at 98-99.
41. Id.
[Vol. 11:2
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Rules and enforcement institutions can give a perception to
MNCs about written law, but political changes42 and influences can
alter the application of IP legal regimes in individual cases, therefore
generating uncertainty for the private sector. Thus, it appears that
most countries will continue to adopt and adhere to IP right regimes
in a manner that is more consistent with international treaties and
expectations, fortify domestic legal institutions, and open up the
possibility of predictable trends; however, there is still the potential
for randomness and variability.4 This is particularly the case with
China because its economy remains a gallimaufry of public and
private property ownership driven by a modernization process that is
gradually migrating further away from communism and toward more
dependence on markets. However, there are very important historical
cultural remnants affixed to this migration.
B. Historical Cultural Influences on IP Rights Protection
Leaders in China, like in many other developing countries, have
been enacting rules as well as establishing and fortifying enforcement
institutions that will more fully protect IP rights. The Chinese
Communist Party (CCP)44 accepts that enhanced IP right protections
are vital to nourishing long-term economic well-being for the
population." China has gradually46 opened its door to the outside
42. Generally speaking, domestic political shifts can be triggered by a number of
events. First, democratic elections can change the composition of those in
government. Certainly, in China, there have not been political shifts to new parties,
but there have been shifts within the Communist Party because of battling factions.
A new government may be more or less prone to support economic integration and
international investment than a previous agreement. Second, there may be some
form of "tied" aid, economic dependence or an international agreement that relatively
"locks in" a government's future purview of action because of promises made to other
countries. This can sometimes provide a pacifying effect that promotes greater
certainty to the private sector.
43. See Ruth L. Gana, Prospects for Developing Countries Under the TRIPS
Agreement, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 735 (1996); see also Arthur Wineburg &
Edmund H. Mantell, Managing Intellectual Property -An International Capital Asset,
99 CoM. L.J. 366 (1994).
44. The CCP is the only true political party in China that governs the country.
Given that there are competing ideologies within the CCP and policy and legislative
outcomes are often negotiated "median" positions among CCP factions, there may be a
relatively close consistency between populace desires and government legislation and
policy.
45. See William P. Alford, How Theory Does -And Does Not - Matter: American
Approaches to Intellectual Property Law in East Asia, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 8, 15-
16 (1994).
20041
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world, 4 "started to transform itself from a command-style economy to
a socialist-capitalist one,"4 8 and has demonstrated a commitment to
cooperate within the structure of international market standards and
IP right protections. Its gradual migration closer to international
expectation and standards ° has exposed the conflict between tradition
and new legal frameworks. Successful implementation of
international agreements in China has proven to be exceedingly
difficult." Market economies have conceptions of property rights that
are generally at odds with Chinese tradition and culture." "[F]or the
vast majority of Chinese, the role of IPR in society remains unclear"
even though China's reformers developed legal awareness programs
for individual citizens and economic actors.53 Therefore, custom and
culture remain dominant factors that influence practical
implementation of rules and IP right enforcement.
At the foundation of IP protection in China is the balance
between collectivist and individualist thought.' Historical
influences55 on operative ideology can be traced back to the teachings
46. China's privatization and marketization process has been gradual because
abrupt change to domestic societal needs in a country of 1.3 billion people could lead
to political and social instability. Its approach has been to open up to foreign
investment to assist in building the economy, but within the context of keeping
control over the economy and stimulating exports to generate economic wealth.
47. Weiqiu Long, Intellectual Property in China, 31 ST. MARY'S L.J. 63, 69 (1999).
With international market integration, the role of the government in the economy
seemingly will decrease, such that government must protect private property and
contract rights, allow the market to allocate resources, and only intervene in the
economy to correct market failures. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Investment
Liberalization and Economic Development: The Role of Bilateral Investment Treaties,
36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 501, 504-05 (1998).
48. Jennifer Fan, The Dilemma of China Intellectual Property Piracy, 4 UCLA J.
INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF, 207, 207 (1999).
49. Long, supra note 47.
50. Id.
51. Thomas T. Moga & Jonathan Raiti, The TRIPS Agreement and China, 29 CHINA
Bus. REV., Nov. 1, 2002.
52. See John D. Mittlestaedt & Robert A. Mittlestaedt, The Protection of Intellectual
Property: Issues of Origination and Ownership, 16 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 14
(1997).
53. See Moga & Raiti, supra note 51.
54. See generally Liwei Wang, The Current Economic and Legal Problems Behind
China s Patent Law, 12 TEMP. INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 1 (1998).
55. Quite ironically, this adoration for historical writers in China and the past made
it a show of respect to copy someone else's work. See generally WILLIAM P. ALFORD,
To STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE 28-29 (1995). "I transmit rather than
[Vol. 11:2446
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of Confucius, who stressed the rights of society over the rights of the
individual." Chinese leaders have utilized traditional beliefs and
conceptions "to preserve conformity and sociopolitical stability.""7
Collectivist ideology, viewed from the perspective of a firm's profit
potential in a market economy, is apt to undermine Western IP right
protections, while individualist thought is more apt to protect such
rights. Individual rights were favored only to the extent that
collective and social needs could be served.58 Collective rights have
outweighed the interests of any one individual or group of individuals
for over fifty years. 9 Since the CCP came to power,' it has only been
over the past two decades that this traditional posture of collectivism
has been relaxed."
create; I believe in and I love the Ancients." DANIEL C.K. CHow, THE LEGAL SYSTEM
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN A NUTSHELL 411 (2003).
56. See generally LUN Yu, THE ANALECTS OF CONFUCIUS (Chichung Huang ed., 1997);
see also Ronald J. Troyer, Chinese Thinking about Crime and Social Control, in
SOCIAL CONTROL IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 45, 51-52 (Ronald J. Troyer et
al. eds., 1989). Confucius thought has designated the importance of particular actors
in society by placing the state first, the collective second, and the right of the
individual last. See Zhengyuan Fu, China's Perception of the Taiwan Issue, 1 UCLA
J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 321, 322-23 (1996-97).
57. John R. Allison & Lianlian Lin, The Evolution of Chinese Attitudes Toward
Property Rights in Invention and Discovery, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 735, 743
(1999).
58. See ALFORD, supra note 55, at 10.
59. Randall P. Peerenboom, Rights, Interests, and the Interest in Rights in China, 31
STAN. J. INT'L L. 359, 367 (1995).
60. In 1950, the government codified IP regulations that ensured State ownership
over property rights and clarified that those who engaged in "invention or creation"
were knowingly participating in a social activity and producing work product that
would ultimately belong to all members of society. Long, supra note 47, at 66.
61. Id. Starting in 1979, economic reform prescribed amendments from collectivist
predispositions toward some degree of individualism and property right protections
even though the "fundamental tenet of ownership by the people" remained. Id. This
is a posture that was supported politically and institutionally by the Chinese
Communist Party, but it is one that has been subject to intermittent shifts. Id. The
Chinese Communist Party's posture can be illustrated by Art. 51 of the PRC
Constitution: "The exercise by citizens of the People's Republic of China of their
freedoms and rights may not infringe upon the interests of the state, of society and of
the collective, or upon lawful freedoms and rights of other citizens." P.R.C. CONST.
art. 51 (Adopted 1982). The trend of change toward a more relaxed balance between
individual and collective rights to promote economic growth can be found in the 1999
amendments to the Constitution. "The People's Republic of China shall be governed
according to law and shall be built into a socialist country based on the rule of law."
Stanley Lubman, Bird in a Cage: A Chinese Law Reform After Twenty Years, 20 Nw.
2004]
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Consistent with this ideological emphasis are informal and
formal means of societal control conflict,62 which makes appreciating
the applicability of tradition and culture to modern legal processes all
the more important. This struggle between informal "moral and
social rules of conduct" and codified state-imposed sanctions has
generally been called a struggle between 1i and fa respectively.63
Some have stated that there has been a distrust of formal law and a
desire to maintain collective harmony in the community, therefore,
implying that emphasizing individual rights undermines community
harmony.64
This enigmatic dilemma between 1i and fa and collectivism and
individualism inclined the CCP to fortify the rule of law with "checks
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 383, 399 (2000); see also China Enacts Constitutional Amendments
to Entrench Private Business, Rule of Law (British Broadcasting Corporation, Mar.
17, 1999). All legal change is to some degree influenced by these norms and the
political will of the CCP, making legal evolution more gradual than it would
otherwise be in a more individualistic Western culture. It has been articulated that
the contents of a constitution must serve the political objectives of those in power.
See Zhang Youyu, Why 'Sida "Has Been Abolished, 23 BEIJING REV., Oct. 6, 1980, at
27.
62. There was a movement back to rely on culturally driven norms of conduct when
Mao Zedong, as head of the CCP, abolished all laws in 1957. See CARLOS WING-HUNG
Lo, CHINA'S LEGAL AWAKENING: LEGAL THEORY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN DENG'S ERA
10 (1995). "Societal control" refers to parameters for acceptable societal conduct.
63. ALBERT HUNG-YEE CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 8-9 (1992). Li's significance as a means of societal
control is that there is integration between the society, the family, and paternalistic
state. Id. at 10. The CCP dominated Chinese society for three decades until 1980 by
utilizing Confucian ideals. Edward J. Epstein, Law and Legitimation in Post-Mao
China, in DOMESTIC LAW REFORMS IN POST MAO CHINA 19, 32 (Pitman B. Potter ed.,
1994) (employing informal power sources of ethical persuasion ); see also Note,
Concepts of Law in the Chinese Anti-Crime Campaign, 98 HARv. L. REV. 1890, 1907
(1985); see also CHEN, supra, at 8 (providing "moral examples"); see also Troyer, supra
note 56, at 45 (conferring remote credence to written sources of law).
64. See Glen R. Butterton, Pirates, Dragons and U.S. Intellectual Property Rights in
China: Problems and Prospects of Chinese Enforcement, 38 ARiz. L. REV. 1081, 1084
(1996). Others have expressed that citizen distrust of law is not only rooted in
respect for Confucian collectivist traditions, but also "in the bitter knowledge that the
Communist Party has exploited law to serve its own often corrupt ends, as well as
those of its more powerful members." Id. at 1083-84. Codified law has the potential
to "disturb" society and devitalize natural harmonious relations. Timothy A. Gelatt,
The People b Republic of China and the Presumption of Innocence, 73 CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 259, 307 (1982). However, it is the abuse of law that most offends the
common Chinese citizen.
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and balances to prevent arbitrary government" action." However,
personal relationships, or guanxi, "remains central in interpersonal,
bureaucratic and commercial dealings in China," making flexibility in
the law still an important variable that has permitted opportunism.6
"China is ruled by people, not laws. '" 7 This phrase cannot be over-
stressed because it has overwhelming consequential implications for
MNCs and IP right protection decisions.' It could make curbing IP
right infringements more difficult or it could make attaining more
effective IP right enforcement more probable.
Certainly, China has been fortifying the rule of law to make it
more transparent and somewhat less influenced by political forces.
Consequently, this has encouraged the flow of much-needed foreign
investment and has given MNCs the perception that it is becoming a
safe country to make investments."
65. Preston M. Torbert, Book Review: China's Internal Debate, 28 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 639, 640 (1995). Enacting formal legal controls to fortify state power. See
James Hugo Friend, Foreword the Rocky Road Toward the Rule of Law in China:
1979-2000, 20 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 369, 373 (2000); see also James V. Feinerman,
The Rule of Law... With Chinese Socialist Characteristics, 96 CURRENT HIST., Sept. 1,
1997. Ironically enough, diminishing the CCP's informal power-based hold on society
has improved individual rights and liberties as well as bestowed heightened
legitimacy to government after de-legitimizing periods. While it is fa today that is
slowly empowering individual rights, fa has also been used as a tool of repression.
See William P. Alford, Of Arsenic and Old Laws: Looking Anew at Criminal Justice in
Late Imperial China, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1180, 1183 (1984).
66. Butterton, supra note 64, at 1113. While personal ties are very important in
China, they will not guarantee success. Kenneth Lieberthal & Geoffrey Lieberthal,
The Great Transition, HARV. BuS. REV. 70, 79 (2003).
67. Ben Dolven, An Easy Way to Lose Your Shirt, FAR E. ECON. REv., Apr. 3, 2003
(quoting Sam Porteous, China Manager for Kroll Associates).
68. See discussion infra Part IIIC.
69. See Linda A. Mabry, Multinational Corporations and U.S. Technology Policy:
Rethinking the Concept of Corporate Nationality, 87 GEo. L.J. 563, 575 (1999).
Cooperative initiatives by governments and assent to international market principles
necessitate that domestic law accommodate the many business forms resulting from
transnational business operations. See Paul B. Stephan, The New International Law
- Legitimacy, Accountability, Authority, and Freedom in the New Global Order, 70 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1555, 1556-57 (1999); see also Mabry, supra, at 575. The property
rights of those operations are protected, since stronger IF protections ostensibly beget
a higher volume of investment. See Jeong-Yeon Lee & Edwin Mansfield, Intellectual
Property Protection and U.S. Foreign Direct Investment, 78 REv. ECON. & STAT. 181
(1996). Indeed, investment choices must adjust for greater uncertainty in the risk-
based rate of return. Deng Xiaoping sought to "assuage foreign fears and thus
encourage foreign investment in China," stimulate new scientific and technological
research in China, encourage exchange of information about protection, and open
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China has assented to a number of treaties7" and is actively
producing legislation and enforcement institutions that are more
consistent with international IP right standards.7' Because transfer
of international intellectual property can accelerate international
investment and concomitantly foster technological progress in
developing countries, China's early focus was fixed on providing
assurances to MNCs that investments would be safe in China. Many
domestic firms now press for enhanced IP protections72 and leaders
now emphasize providing more protections to domestic businesses."
In some IP-based industries, it is quite feasible that Chinese
enterprises will dominate the market once the infrastructure is first
developed by foreign technology.74 This is because local firms have
advantages in many areas, such as better access to marketing
channels and government preferences in import and tax laws.
C. Patent and Trade Secret Protection Institutions in China
While new laws in China provide more objectivity and
transparency to societal norms, vagueness and general phrases may
encourage arbitrary enforcement.7' Thus, distinctions between 1i and
China up to the opportunities of participation in international institutions and
agreements. Allison & Lin, supra note 57, at 754. Jiang Zemin followed this path, as
his successor, President Hu Jintao.
70. This increasing level of international cooperation has included joining the World
Intellectual Property Organization (1980), the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Intellectual Property Rights (1985), the Treaty for Integrated Circuits Property Right
Protection (1989), the Madrid Agreement for the Registration of International
Trademarks (1989), The Berne Convention (1992), the Universal Copyright
Convention (1992), the Audio-Visual Products Treaty (1993), and the Patent
Cooperation Treaty (1994). Long, supra note 47, at 70. It also assisted in "drafting of
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, including
Trade in Counterfeit Goods (TRIPS)" in 1995 and signed a Memorandum of
Understanding regarding intellectual property protections with the United States in
1989, 1992, and 1995. Id.; see also Allison & Lin, supra note 57, at 757-59.
71. See Long, supra note 47, at 70-71.
72. See La Croix & Konan, supra note 27, at 770-72.
73. Ansson, supra note 4, at 17-18. The privatization process has led many
previously state-owned production entities to seek patent protection for technological
advances. Michael Oksenberg et al., Advancing Intellectual Property Rights:
Information Technologies and the Course of Economic Development in China, 7 NAT'L
BUREAU ASIAN RES., 1996, at 9.
74. See Leslie Cataldo, A Dynasty Weaned from Biotechnology: The Emerging Face of
China, 26 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 151, 171-72 (1998).
75. See Perry Keller, Sources of Order in Chinese Law, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 711, 740
(1994).
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fa are still appropriate. However, legal institutions have become
more popularly accepted." China has been an active participant in
various international IP protection regimes" and is dedicated to
providing heightened IP rights protections because its economic
modernization is dependent on technological innovations.78
Unfortunately, there are still many structural and traditional reasons
that impede achieving significant levels of success. 9 Western rules of
IP protection have proven somewhat difficult to assimilate. 80
Nonetheless, China's progress in modernizing its patent system to
make it more consistent with global business expectations has been
quite remarkable.8
One of the most important issues for a MNC that has decided to
make a technology-based investment in China that may be protected
by patent law and/or trade secret law is the organizational structure
that should be employed when making the investment. This question
inevitably turns on the extent that either of these two institutional
frameworks can be relied upon if there is an infringement. A
discussion of the patent and trade secret protection institutions in
China follows, which will then be followed by an analysis of how
MNCs have interpreted these frameworks to best protect IP value at
risk and how political influence impacts this decision.
1. Patent Protection
While China recognized state ownership of inventions as early
as 1950,2 it was Deng Xiaoping who spearheaded patent protection
76. See Lubman, supra note 61, at 399.
77. Ansson, supra note 4, at 8.
78. Angela Mia Beam, Piracy of American Intellectual Property in China, 4 J. INT'L
L. & PRAc. 335, 342 (1995); see also Liwei Wang, The Current Economic and Legal
Problems Behind China s Patent Law, 12 TEMP. INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 1, 4 (1998).
79. Some have been
unconvinced that China has developed, or will even ultimately
develop, an effective patent system. Some are simply unconvinced
that centuries-old Chinese cultural traditions can be reversed in the
foreseeable future. Others are unpersuaded that entrepreneurialism
and other hallmarks of an efficient market economy can coexist with
socialistic and authoritarian policies.
Allison & Lin, supra note 57, at 737-38.
80. See Richard Thurston, Country Risk Management: China and Intellectual
Property Protection, 27 INT'L LAw. 51, 60 (1993).
81. See generally PETER FENG, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINA (1997).
82. Laurance P. Harrington, Recent Amendments to Chinas Patent Law: The
Emperor's New Clothes, 17 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 337, 342-48 (1994). The patent
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reform' to make it more congruous with gradual market reforms.4
China enacted its first patent law in 1985,85 but because of many
limitations in this law' and threats by the United States Trade
Representative,87 it was substantially amended in 1993' and then
again in 2000.8" The items that concerned foreign investors and were
modified in 1993 included "expanding the technological fields of
laws were based on the Soviet socialist model from 1950 to the late 1970s, and they
did not provide the incentive for innovation. See Allison & Lin, supra note 57, at 749-
52.
83. In the late 1970's and early 1980's, China focused more on patent protection.
Under Deng Xiaoping's direction, a patent law drafting committee
began an exceptionally thorough three-year effort to learn as much
as possible about the world's patent systems. Many Chinese,
especially those with technical education, were sent to study the
patent systems of developed nations such as the United States,
Japan, and West Germany, and even to some socialist countries
considered by China to be prosperous such as Yugoslavia. The
drafting committee also acquired and translated the patent laws of
more than thirty countries. After almost two dozen drafts, the
committee presented to the People's Congress proposed legislation for
a patent system based largely on the German model. Once in the
People's Congress, it was substantially amended before enactment by
those with little of the knowledge or experience of those on the
drafting committee.
Allison & Lin, supra note 57, at 754. Some have commented that China's legal
reform has not been sufficiently aggressive. Cataldo, supra note 74, at 151.
84. See generally WILLIAM H. OVERHOLT, THE RISE OF CHINA: How ECONOMIC
REFORM IS CREATING A NEW SUPERPOWER (1993).
85. See Hamideh Ramjerdi & Anthony D'Amato, The Intellectual Property Rights
Laws of the People's Republic of China, 21 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 169, 175
(1995).
86. Allison & Lin, supra note 57, at 754-57.
87. See Louis S. Sorell, A Comparative Analysis of Selected Aspects of Patent Law in
China and the United States, 11 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 319, 321 (2002). Pursuant to
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, the president can take unilateral action against
foreign countries that pursue discriminatory trade practices. Jill M. Brannelly, The
United States' Grant of Permanent Normal Trade Status to China: A Recipe for
Tragedy or Transformation?, 25 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 565, 575 (2002).
88. See Patent Law of the People's Republic of China, available at
http://www.cpahkltd.com! Publication/Laws/NewPatentLaw.html (last visited Mar.
12, 2004) [hereinafter Patent Law of China]. U.S. relations have played an important
role in China's legal reform process. Memorandum of Understanding Between the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's
Republic of China on the Protection of Intellectual Property, Jan. 17, 1992, U.S.-
P.C.R., 34 I.L.M. 676 (1995).
89. See Sorell, supra note 87, at 323.
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patent protection... extending the duration of patent rights for" both
inventions and utility models, narrowing the scope of compulsory
license rules, and shortening the patent approval process.90 In 2000,
the patent law changes included accommodating the needs of the
socialist market economy, strengthening the protection of patent
rights, simplifying and accelerating the patent approval process, and
harmonizing the patent law with international standards."'
Accordingly, codified substantive law has become more consistent
with international standards.
One can attain a patent by filing ' with the Patent Administrative
Organ under the State Council93 and proving that the product
invention has novelty, inventiveness, and practical applicability.94 If
these elements are met, the application will be published within
eighteen months of filing the application.95 Once obtained, the patent
holder has an exclusive monopoly right to use and exploit the
invention."6 If the application is defective, there is a right to cure it.97
If it is held that the requirements of patentability have not been met,
the patent will be denied, but there is a right to have the Patent
Reexamination Board review that decision." Patentability in China is
denied for:
"(1) scientific discoveries;
(2) rules and methods for mental activities;
(3) methods for the diagnosis or for the treatment of diseases;
(4) animal and plant varieties;
(5) substances obtained by means of nuclear transformation.""
Patents are also denied for inventions "contrary to the laws of the
State or social morality or that [are] detrimental to public interest."'
While there is always a risk that a decision will deny a patent when it
would be granted in another country, China has made much progress
90. Id. at 322.
91. Id. at 323.
92. China follows a "first to file" system. Patent Law of China, supra note 88, art. 9.
93. Id. art. 3.
94. Id. art. 22.
95. Id. art. 34.
96. Id. arts. 11, 39 & 40. The monopoly right is granted for twenty years for
inventions and ten years for utility models. Id. art. 42.
97. The patent administration organ must notify of the defect and give an
opportunity to cure. Patent Law of China, supra note 88, art. 37.
98. Id. art. 42.
99. Id. art. 25.
100. Id. art. 5.
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in more efficiently and effectively processing applications and
granting patents over the past ten years.'0 '
Having substantive laws that stimulate innovations 2 and are
consistent with markets is fundamental; however, institutions that
can provide transparency and consistency to the substantive
framework are also critical. A country can ascribe parameters for
legal action, but a substantive legal framework means very little
unless enforcement institutions are readily available to give bite to
the rules. The risk inherent with Chinese investment has not been
due to a lack of substantive IP right rules, but of having inadequate
IP right enforcement."' It has taken time for China to gradually
fortify its judicial system," modify administrative institutions, and
establish a National Intellectual Property Office.!0 '
If an applicant has attained a patent, and that patent is violated,
the patent holder's rights may be enforced by either judicial or
administrative means.0 6 The judicial route has been said to be more
disentangled from many of the political influences that were
previously common in China since judges are supposedly appointed
now without any particular affiliation to the CCP.'0 ' The government
is dedicated to decreasing political influences in the law and making
improvements in the judiciary. This does appear to be the trend. 8
However, there is still an unwritten requirement that laws are
executed in a custom consistent with Party ideology and a formal
selection process for judges that still makes them accountable to local
101. Yin Xintian, A Brief Introduction to the Patent Practice in China, 9 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 253, 254-55 (1998).
102. Conflict has been noted between having substantive protections that foster
innovation and protecting IP rights. See Wang, supra note 54, at 2.
103. See Douglas Clark, IP Rights Will Improve in China - Eventually, 27 CHINA
Bus. REV., May 1, 2000.
104. After the decimation of legal institutions during the Cultural Revolution and
the existence of societal characteristics that made non-adversative, negotiation, and
self-help the most accepted method of resolving disputes, there was arguably very
little consistency between what was needed to support a substantive framework of
marketlindividual-based IP rights and enforcement institutions.
105. Long, supra note 47, at 69.
106. Patent Law of China, supra note 88, art. 57.
107. Davis Hill & Judith Evans, Comment, Chinese Patent Law: Recent Changes
Align China More Closely with Modern International Practice, 27 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L
L. & ECON. 359, 372 (1993-94).
108. See Apparent Full Text of Work Report of Chinese People's Procuratorate, BBC
Monitoring International Reports, Mar. 31, 2003.
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government officials.'" Top Chinese government officials admit that
the judiciary is plagued with problems such as partiality,
incompetence, and corruption. ' Judges within the court system are
continuously becoming more knowledgeable about IP law," '1 but
judicial enforcement, or "civil action"; however, it is still impractical
because it is often slow, difficult to prove with evidence, lacking in the
more effective "raid and seizure" tactics available in administrative
enforcement, and cannot be combined with injunctive relief."'
The administrative method of enforcement is the more prevalent
process of attaining relief in China."1 An administrative action will
109. "[Jludges are elected by local people's congresses or appointed by the standing
committee of the local people's congresses," meaning that they are oftentimes
controlled by local government. See Wang, supra note 78, at 37-38.
110. The issues within the Chinese judiciary system have recently been addressed
by the Supreme People's Court:
[Iln December 2001, the President of the Supreme People's Court,
Xiao Yang, stressed that courts should conduct trials impartially and
efficiently, and announced a series of measures to improve the
professional standards of judges. These measures included
amendments to the Law on Judges and new regulations stipulating
the procedures to dismiss incompetent or corrupt judges. While
announcing the new measures, the Supreme Court President also
acknowledged that people's confidence in the judicial system had
been seriously harmed by nepotism and bias, particularly in many
provincial courts.
People t Republic of China: Establishing the Rule of Law and Respect for Human
Rights: The Need for Institutional and Legal Reforms, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, Oct.
22, 2002, at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA170522002?open&of=ENG-CHN (last
visited March 11, 2004). [Hereinafter Amnesty International Memorandum to the
State Council]. It is possible that judges may make decisions based less on the rule of
law and more on political or Confucian thought. See Wang, supra note 78, at 38.
111. In 1993, the Beijing Intermediate People's Court established an intellectual
property division and began to train judges in the law of IP. See Butterton, supra
note 64, at 1101. Courts that would hear IP matters in other regions of the country
were also established, along with an appellate division in Beijing. See id.
112. See Chow, supra note 19, at 466-67. There are also no guidelines for
transferring evidence from an administrative raid and seizure to the courts. See id.
at 467.
113. See id. at 454.
Administrative enforcement power over counterfeiting in China is
currently not centralized in a single entity, but is divided among a
number of different administrative entities. The Administration of
Industry and Commerce ("AIC") has primary jurisdiction over
trademarks, including matters of registration, administration and
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normally consist of the IP holder complaining to the requisite
government agency by petition,' 14 which will then decide whether to
investigate and conduct a raid of the premises of the alleged
counterfeiter's operations."5  Since use of force via raids is
permissible, injunctions are also available with an administrative
action.'  Raids may be swift and effective, but they are still not
sufficiently harsh enough to deter the piracy from occurring in the
first place.117 Experts have commented that it is available only when
those with political power desire it to occur."'
In summary, there have been improvements in patent right
enforcement institutions. Chinese courts have made notable decisions
ending IP infringement in many cases, and raids throughout the
country by administrative action have become commonplace, leading
to the closure of various production facilities."' Despite much
improvement, the degree of IP right protection has certainly not risen
to the level that technologically abundant countries would desire.'
2. Trade Secret Protection
As with patents, the communist economic system regarded trade
secrets as public property. China agreed in 1994 to enact an Unfair
enforcement. Another administrative body, the Technical
Supervision Bureau ("TSB") has authority over product quality and
consumer protection issues, and as a result, also has enforcement
power over counterfeit goods. In some instances, brand owners can
also seek enforcement from the Patent Administration Office, based
upon its jurisdiction over patent rights, and from the General
Administration of Customs, based upon its jurisdiction over China's
national borders, where imports or exports of counterfeit products
are involved.
Id.
114. Id. at 456.
115. See Sorell, supra note 87, at 329. "An administrative authority for patent
affairs is established in every province, autonomous region, and municipality. The
patent administrative office has the power to enjoin acts of infringement and may
mediate the damages issue upon the request of the parties." Id.
116. See id. at 335; see also Chow, supra note 19, at 456.
117. See generally Clark, supra note 103.
118. See generally Joseph Kahn, To Be Rich, Chinese and in Trouble: 3 Tales, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 13, 2002, at 1.
119. Ansson, supra note 4, at 12-13. In fact, the number of raids has increased
significantly over time. See Clark, supra note 103.
120. See Butterton, supra note 64, at 1101; see also Assafa Endeshaw, The US-China
Intellectual Property Dispute: Another View, 9 ASIAN Bus. L. REV. 49 (1995); see
Ansson, supra note 4, at 24-25.
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Competition Law that would protect trade secrets."' There has been
more hesitancy to protect other types of IP trade secrets because of
the belief that foreigners could more easily abuse trade secret
violations."' While the Unfair Competition Law is the primary source
of protection, trade secrets can also be protected by contract,
123 tort,' 2
and criminal law."
This area of IP is more difficult to contend with due to trade
secret violations involving infringements that can occur in myriad
ways and operate on relatively general provisions open to much
interpretation. Political will is even more important when more
flexibility in law exists. Indeed, more ambiguities can arise with
trade secret violations than in other areas of IP protection. For
instance, business methods that give a competitive advantage can be
classified into: (1) manual ways of administering a business, (2)
placing business operations into a technical system, and (3) business
processes that are indispensable to a product technology." 6  Many
121. Law of the People's Republic of China for Countering Unfair Competition
(Adopted at the Third Session of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National
People's Congress and Promulgated on September 2, 1993), available at
http://www.apeccp.org.tw/doc/China/ Competition/cncom2.html (last visited Mar. 12,
2004). [hereinafter Unfair Competition Law]. U.S. pressure likely had a great deal to
do with the enactment of this law. Yuan Cheng, Legal Protection of Trade Secrets in
the People's Republic of China, 5 PAC. RIM. L. & POLY J. 261, 262 (1996). Article 4 of
the Sino-U.S. Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the Protection of
Intellectual Property Rights, signed on January 17, 1992, required the Chinese
government to protect trade secrets and to enact legislation domestically that codified
trade secret rights. Id. at 263.
122. See id. at 269.
123. Id. at 278. Contract law can protect trade secrets by governing the relationship
between employer and employee. However, limitations are that protection only
extends to parties to the contract and lasts for the duration of the contract, and it
may be difficult to attain evidence to prove breach. Id. at 278-79.
124. Id. at 279. Although tort law can provide protection for trade secrets in many
countries, and it may be possible to use this action in China as well by using General
Principles of Civil Law of the PRC, serious limitations may exist in using this as a
viable action for an IP violation. Cheng, supra note 121, at 279-81.
125. Id. at 281. While criminal liability is not available in the Unfair Competition
Law, it could be applied under China's criminal law provisions. See id. at 281-84.
126. Xiang, supra note 24, at 800. A business process that was patentable in the
United States but not in China and which falls into the first and second categories of
business process is where an "on-line system that streamlined the traditional
international trade transaction process" was denied in China, but a system called
"Virtual Sales Personnel" that provided an "interactive sales representative system
for providing sales guidance" was patentable in the United States. See id. at 795-96.
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legal systems differ on whether the former two categories should be
patentable. 2 ' China would likely deny patentability for business
methods that fall into the former two categories, 12 8 which means that
a MNC's only alternative is to rely on trade secret law. China would
be more apt to grant a patent in the third category, 2' allowing a
choice for a MNC to protect the invention as a trade secret or as a
patent.
Likewise, more uncertainty arises in trade secret protection
because infringements can be due to the illegal attainment of business
secrets, as in the case of commercial espionage or when technology-
exposed personnel move from one firm to another. The rationale for
trade secret protection is that certain processes give value and a
competitive advantage to a firm. Someone who illegally obtains
internal information about business processes should keep those
processes proprietarily within a firm, not subjecting them to
appropriation. This protection should also include someone who was
privy to those processes as an employee, since the employee was
working on behalf of the company and not as a risk-assuming
entrepreneur.
The legal framework that endeavors to protect unfair competition
also encompasses trade secret protections. China's Unfair
Competition Law requires that to develop the socialist market
economy, business shall follow principles of "voluntariness, equality,
fairness honesty and credibility, and observe generally recognized
business ethics.""'° Within this framework, a "business secret" is
defined as: "technical information and operational information which
is not known to the public, which is capable of bringing economic
benefits to the owners of the rights, which has practical applicability
and which the owners of the rights have taken measures to keep
secret."' 3 ' It is illegal to obtain business secrets owned by others
through theft, promise of gain, or any coercive or illegitimate means.'
A party possessing business secrets of another cannot use or disclose
those business secrets when those secrets are obtained by illegitimate
Likely, the Chinese example would fall into the first category of business process and
the United States example would fall under the second type of business process.
127. Id. at 805-12.
128. Id. at 803-05.
129. Id. at 823.
130. Unfair Competition Law, supra note 121, arts. 1 & 2.
131. Id. art. 10.
132. Id.
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means or in violation of the rights of the owner.'33 This prohibition
also applies to a third party who "obtains, uses or discloses" the
protected business secrets when the party knew or should have
known the secret was obtained by illegal acts." The law is therefore
applicable to both the direct infringer and third parties.
Jurisdictional overlap in the legal frameworks, the nature of trade
secret rights, employer-employee relationships, liability, and related
ambiguities might require China to enact a special trade secret law to
address these issues.
When a trade secret violation occurs involving a breach of
contract, the aggrieved party may seek either an administrative or
court-based civil remedy.'36 However, if no contractual relationship
exists, a party may seek an administrative remedy, which must be
enforced by the government under the Unfair Competition Law.'37
The "control and inspection authorities" investigate any potential
trade secret infringement and have a fairly broad right to discover
materials, inspect relevant information to determine any Unfair
Competition Law violation" and decide whether to assess a fine. 9 If
there is a trade secret infringement, the injured party is entitled to
damages; the damages are assessed by calculating losses incurred as
a result of the infringement or on the basis of profit gained by the
trade secret infringer, and also any investigation costs sustained.'40
The investigations normally must be kept confidential' because the
nature of the information being inspected unavoidably requires
decreased transparency in the application of the law. Similar to
patent protection, the administrative remedy is more rapid and
effective as opposed to a court based remedy, but may be prone to
more "local favoritism" and corruption.'
If a party is not satisfied with the punishment assessed by the
administrative remedy process, it may appeal within fifteen days to
133. Id.
134. See id.
135. Cheng, supra note 121, at 275.
136. A contract law violation would involve an individual suing for civil liability for
breach of contract in a People's Court. See id. at 284-88.
137. See Unfair Competition Law, supra note 121, art. 3.
138. See id. arts. 16-19. This refers to the industrial and commercial administrative
department above the county level. See also Cheng, supra note 121, at 290.
139. Unfair Competition Law, supra note 121, art. 25.
140. See id. art. 20.
141. See Cheng, supra note 121, at 270.
142. Id. at 291, 293-94.
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"the competent authority at the next higher levels for reconsideration"
within the control and inspection authority.1 4 1 If the aggrieved party
is not satisfied with this decision, it may then institute proceedings in
a competent People's Court.!"
3. Culture's Influence on Patent and Trade Secret Protection
Institutions
China adopted new regulatory frameworks in order to protect IP
rights through international cooperation and the desire to modernize
its economy by increasing technology. Evaluating the trade-off
between receiving monopoly rights for publicly disclosing the
intricacies of an invention through patenting it'45 and keeping the
technology in-house as a trade secret that provides a competitive
advantage, is an important decision in any legal system. However,
the decision becomes all the more important in China because of how
frameworks are interpreted and the extent to which enforcement
institutions are prejudiced by political forces, particularly when there
is an option to request a judicial or administrative enforcement
procedure, or perhaps some other forum.'46 The rest of this article
explores this issue within the context of the MNCs' investment
decision and the real economic value at risk from a potential IP
infringement.
143. Unfair Competition Law, supra note 121, art. 29.
144. Id.
145. MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAw 1 (1998).
146. Conciliation and arbitration are potential alternative forums that may possibly
be less influenced by cultural and political forces; however, these methods also have
limits because executive branch enforcement is necessary to the extent that
recalcitrance to comply exists on the part of the infringer. If an IP violation is covert
or there is an intractable party that is knowingly doing something illegal, conciliation
and arbitration may not be options. This would differ from the circumstance
occurring when there is a contentious patent infringement case and a legitimate
dispute, or contract issues in a trade secret case. When a reputable company is the
alleged infringer there is a better possibility of resolving such disputes in a forum
outside of the administrative or court structure.
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III. ECONOMIC INTEGRATION WITH CHINA AND IP PROTECTION
A. (IP Value at Risk) = (Risk of Infringement) x (Economic Value Lost
as a Result of Piracy)
The risk that MNCs often accepts when transferring IP into a
foreign country is clear from a broad perspective. 7 but often
ambiguous when quantification for the proposed investment is
necessary." s There are even greater uncertainties when it is difficult
to assess an accurate value for the true economic loss if piracy were to
occur. 49 Any foreign MNC expansion must consider risk of loss in
expected profitability,"' and whether resorting to a more integrated
organizational form of market penetration might decrease risk. While
market and competition uncertainties can materialize and call into
question a foreign investment's profitability projections, failing to
adequately address environmental risks by not taking effective
organizational precautions and improperly managing contractual
arrangements can also account for some loss of investment value.
Protecting IP value in the international market must include
ascertaining and examining foreign legal IP right institutions and
relevant political influences within the context of different
147. See Intellectual Property: United States Firms Lose Billions Annually to Foreign
Piracy, ITC Intellectual Property Study Finds, 5 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 290 (Mar. 2,
1988). A dynamic investment environment with uncertain IP right protections
necessitates that a MNC affirmatively manage local risks. Yadong Luo,
Determinants of Entry in an Emerging Market: A Multilevel Approach, 38 J. MGMT.
STuD. 443, 450 (2001).
148. This process is evidenced by considering the joint responsibilities and due
diligence standards required of both lawyers and accountants in calculating ROI for a
FDI. Accountants are primarily responsible for placing a value on assets, but placing
a value on IP rights, or goodwill, is an arduous process that becomes exceedingly
more complicated for foreign investments given legal and political risks. On the other
hand, it is the lawyer's responsibility to ascertain potential IP right losses and risks,
which in an international joint-venture, merger, or licensing agreement, can be of
primary interest when incorporating the overall value of the business expansion and
the entity's assets and liabilities. The lawyer "must include the identification of all
relevant rights, an assessment of their worth in the context of exclusivity, validity
and enforcement, and an identification of possible liabilities." Evelyn M. Sommer &
Mauro Premutico, Intellectual Property Issues in Mergers and Acquisitions, N.Y. ST.
B.J., May-June 1995, at 42.
149. See Patrick H. Hu, 'Mickey Mouse "in China: Legal and Cultural Implications
in Protecting U.S. Copyrights, 14 B.U. INT'L L.J. 81, 94 n.83 (1996).
150. See generally Tailan Chi & Donald J. McGuire, Collaborative Ventures and
Value of Learning: Integrating the Transaction Cost and Strategic Option Perspectives
on the Choice of Market Entry Modes, 27 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 285 (1996).
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organizational structures, and forecasting the economic impact once
enforcement occurs. The rest of this paper will incorporate the
following simple formula to assess value of IP at risk: (Value) = (Risk
of Infringement) x (Economic Value Lost as a Result of Piracy).
Risk of Infringement considers three aspects of the foreign
investment: (1) the organizational form of investment and the level of
integration most desirable when IP rights are annexed to a product
expansion into a foreign country, (2) the risk of loss resulting from
unexpected dispositions under the codified law or enforcement
measures when there is a patent or trade secret infringement, and (3)
the political dynamics that can influence the IP right protection
framework or enforcement measures. The following section will
employ empirical literature to buttress this framework involving
studies that have examined MNCs in emerging markets generally,
but will be applied to the context of China.
B. The MNCs Organizational Form of Investment
Economic integration can take several forms that are generally
categorized from the strongest to the weakest form of integration.151
The various forms of integration, in order of decreasing strength are:
wholly-owned or majority ownership foreign direct investment (FDI),
joint venture, technology licensing, and trade in merchandise and
services." 2 Firms normally choose the form of investment that will
maximize its risk-adjusted return on investment (ROI)."5 ' There are
many reasons for choosing a particular form of investmentj M but this
151. "Strongest to weakest form of integration" refers to the level of control the firm
will have over the investment and business processes. It also assumes the desire to
have a long-term presence in the host country. Doug Ierley, Private Capital Flows as
a Springboard for World Bank Reform, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1, 3 (2002). Also, a
stronger form of integration normally places more investment value at risk.
152. See generally James R. Markusen, The Boundaries of Multinational Enterprises
and the Theory of International Trade, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1995, at 168.
153. See generally A. Madhok, Cost, Value and Foreign Market Entry Mode: The
Transaction and the Firm, 18 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 39 (1997).
154. Other factors that are influential in determining the form of economic
integration include relative bargaining power with the host government; see
Boddewyn & Brewer, supra note 22, at 119, interests in ownership, location
advantages, internationalization advantages; see John H. Dunning, Toward an
Eclectic Paradigm of International Production: A Restatement and Some Possible
Extensionss, 19 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 1 (1988), minimizing transaction costs of the firm;
Erin Anderson & Hubert Gatignon, Modes of Foreign Entry: A Transaction Cost
Analysis and Propositions, J. INT'L Bus. STUD., Fall 1986, at 1, and organizational
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section will focus solely on the consideration of IP right protection and
how it influences investment forms.
The form of investment is a decisive factor when considering IP
rights in emerging markets.1" The form of investment is dependent
upon whether IP rights are based primarily on patent law or are
partially protected by keeping certain processes confidential as in-
house trade secrets. Often, a process or product innovation for which
a patent may be attained could also be protected in-house as a trade
secret. In fact, if a product invention or process is not likely to meet
the host government's definition of "patentability," or enforcement
mechanisms are questioned, then protecting the product's process
technology as a trade secret may be the only alternative. Both patent
and trade secret protections can safeguard the MNC's IP rights in
China, but precautions must be taken, expectations modified, and
proactive management of the environment deliberated. There is an
increasing vagueness between the definition of technology and
business methods as innovations throughout the world, and China
has been especially reluctant to protect business methods as
patents.
C. Risk Assessment of Investment and Organizational Structure
1. Introduction
The risk-adjusted value of IP rights can be diminished when the
host country's institutional frameworks and enforcement mechanisms
are lacking, ambiguous, or unpredictable. Despite the regular and
often prudent decision to avoid foreign jurisdiction by stipulating to
choice of law and arbitration clauses in some international business
contracts; there is no way to evade a foreign country's legal system
regarding the use of the IP in foreign nations because its very
presence in that territory is what gives the IP value. If an IP right
violation occurs within the sovereign territory of another country, the
host country's executive authority or judiciary must ascertain and
enforce the MNC's IP rights.
A value must be placed on the IP when a MNC considers an IP-
annexed foreign investment.'57 Once an assessment of the likelihood
capability of the MNC; David J. Teece et al., Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic
Management, 18 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 509 (1997).
155. See Luo, supra note 147, at 443.
156. Xiang, supra note 24, at 795.
157. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
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of protection for a given type of IP has been made, a discount rate can
be applied for purposes of valuing the investment for negotiations
with potential joint venture partners or licensees, or to assist in
calculating a company's ROI'58 in relation to the FDI. Framing
potential risks and effectually managing the IP rights environment
within the political and legal framework of the country can preempt
complications by lessening the uncertainty that normally exists under
conditions of asymmetric information in foreign technology
investments."9
The value of the investment is influenced by natural forces,
strategic business planning, market dynamics, and also by
government policies within the particular legal framework.
Consequently, political and regulatory concerns are among the most
important considerations when calculating the value of IP for FDI."
As previously described, China's history and culture have conceived
dynamic interactions between political and legal influences"' on
patent protection in courts6 2 and when pursing an administrative
remedy.'63 These interactions are also present in the case of trade
secret protection in both legal and administrative remedies."M
Businesses often employ particular organizational structures to
accommodate weaknesses in a foreign country's IP framework,
thereby forming a strategic balance, which relies on both trade secret
and patent protections.
158. "Return on investment" is the expected percentage of annual profit that can be
generated over the term of the investment. The percentage is based on the amount of
the investment. Patent protection is most valuable to a company when there is a
unique feature annexed to its products or processes. North, supra note 13, at 113.
When placed in terms of asset valuation and within the context of differing legal
institutional structures, at one extreme, if a country has no IP protection regime and
the value of a proposed FDI is derived 50% from IP, then the value of the FDI in the
foreign country may be 50% of the originally anticipated value, or possibly less,
because the MNC could be left to compete without research and design advantages
and efficiencies that it would otherwise have if the IP were protected. The risk that
all IP value concomitant with an international investment will be lost is near 100% if
there are no IP protection institutions and there are local entities that believe a profit
can be made by pirating the product.
159. See generally Nancy T. Gallini & Brian D. Wright, Technology Transfer Under
Asymmetric Information, 21 RAND J. ECON. 147 (1990).
160. See Leuz, supra note 18, at 4.
161. CHEN, supra note 63, at 8-9.
162. See Wang, supra note 54, at 37-38.
163. See Kahn, supra note 118.
164. See Cheng, supra note 121, at 293-94.
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2. Legal System Expectations and Organizational Structure of
Investment
If a host country has a weak legal system, process technology is
more readily kept confidential within the firm and free from external
duplication. This reduces the need to rely on legal remedies and may
diminish the risk that IP rights will be violated. However, additional
internal protections can sufficiently increase product costs,"' as well
as increase other administrative costs in defending an infringement
when a violation has occurred.' The more that a firm relies on
proprietary process technology, the more that the following analysis is
apropos, and the discussion on product technology should be balanced
to the extent that it is at issue.' 67
This does not mean that an assessment of the legal system is not
necessary if process technology is solely at issue, or comprises most of
IP value. The issue still exists as to whether to file for a patent, if the
technology is.an innovation that can meet China's relatively higher
threshold definition of "patentability,168 or to protect the innovation
as a trade secret. Likewise, the type of organizational structure that
would be most beneficial for the company's internal dynamics in the
foreign market is also an issue, particularly when there could be an
associated domestic firm that could serve as a joint venture partner. 9
165. If protecting a process within the company is the chosen method of protection,
the MNC must be willing to employ extra costs to ensure that there are security
procedures that will protect the confidentiality of the process. Those employees who
are privy to the process must be screened and should be required to sign
confidentiality agreements in order to invoke contract and unfair trade practices law
which will provide remedies if there is a violation. Firewalls must be created and
there must be incentives to keep employees from disclosing business processes.
166. Chow, supra note 19, at 451.
167. For example, if a company finds in a proposed joint venture, that 70% of the
value that the MNC brings to the partnership is IP, and that 80% of the IP is process
technology and 20% is product technology, then simple calculations of value at risk
might assume that 56% (70% x 80%) of value that could be lost, given the risk of
lacking IP rights enforcement when it should otherwise be reasonably provided, will
be dependent on a process technology analysis; while 14% (20% x 70%) of product loss
could be risked solely by placing the product on the market. Given this particular
numerical breakdown of asset value, the dominant analysis and concern will be with
process technology, and thus in turn, organizational structure of a business can
provide much insight.
168. Patent Law of the People's Republic of China, ch. 2, art. 22, available at
http://www.chinaiprlaw.com/english/laws/laws4.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2004); see
also Xiang, supra note 24, at 795.
169. This is a decision that can assist in ascertaining profit sharing, the degree of in-
house IP protections needed between firms, and the frictions related to technological
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If the form of economic integration is not being chosen to diminish
risk of relatively uncertain legal institutional structures, then more
emphasis can be placed on other cost attributes of the business
decision, such as the desire to decrease marginal costs of internally
policing the IP rights and shifting that cost externally17 to the legal
system. Under this scenario, a company may choose a less costly non-
hierarchical form of integration that is more prone to accept the
contingency that technology could seep outside the firm, but could
handle more business dealings with reduced information costs.
MNCs are reluctant to release technology, fearing that protected
information might enter the foreign market either through
negotiations with potential joint ventures partners or via the terms of
a binding contract. The amount of process technology that a company
is willing to relinquish should correlate with a combination of factors
such as: the degree of IP rights protections expected in the legal
system, the value of that technology, and the risk of duplication in
that foreign market. Because of these risks, there is also an inverse
relationship between a hierarchical investment structure and reliance
on the foreign legal system to protect IP rights. As countries increase
IP rights protections, firms will choose more technology licensing and
joint ventures and less FDI'71 because the risk of IP loss decreases
when the ability to rely on the legal system increases. Foreign
enterprises doing business in China have been reluctant to license
technologies because of weak IP right protections."2
If uncertainty exists in a host country's IP legal protection regime
and "process" technology rather than "product" technology'73 is
and managerial transfer costs. See Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, Why Investors
Value Multinationality, 64 J. Bus. 165 (1991).
170. See DOUGLAS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 32-35 (1990).
171. See Ignatius Horstmann & James R. Markusen, Licensing Versus Direct
Investment: A Model of Internalization by the Multinational Enterprise, 20 CAN. J.
ECON. 464 (1987).
172. La Croix & Konan, supra note 27, at 769.
173. Based on this legal analysis and assessment of risk for patent and trade secret
rights, one must also demarcate between process and product technology value loss
because precautions that can be taken to maintain value will differ as predicated on
characteristics of each. Patent protection for technology can include the product itself
when sold to the public (product technology) and the right to protect operations of
efficiently and significantly producing the product (process technology). The conflict
inherent in deciding between whether to protect IP as a trade secret, or by filing for a
patent can apply to both process and product technology. On one hand, China's law
does provide enhanced protections regarding trade secrets because it recognizes "prior
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primarily at issue, then one might employ a stronger and more
localized form of economic integration to prevent information
leakages. However, if a process can be patented, but is instead
maintained as an in-house trade secret, and a competing firm
develops the process, then risk of IP value loss could actually be
higher than if patent protection was sought and uncertainties of
patent enforcement institutions were relied upon."' The likelihood of
patent infringement is higher in a less reliable legal framework
because of the required public disclosure of process technology. The
potential benefits reaped from filing for patent protection must be
contemplated against the expected costs to enforce a patent
infringement in the foreign jurisdiction, and the possibility of
increased costs in constructing and managing an organizational
foreign presence that makes external informational leakages
improbable.
If the risk-adjusted expected value loss of relying on the legal
system is less than the cost of enhanced in-house protections for a
process technology as a trade secret (as modified by the probability of
trade secret leakages), then patent protection might be chosen over
trade secret protection if it is available. This premise applies even
more readily to firms with technologies that are more expensive to
develop but easily copied (e.g. chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and
computerized processes), and is less likely to impact lower-technology
based investments.'7 5 Alternatively, if it is possible to protect
information internally from reverse engineering once the product is
placed on the market,'76 then employing a hierarchical organizational
form may better protect IP by keeping process trade secrets
user rights." This is an example of a party developing a new technology and choosing
to protect that technology as a trade secret, but another party develops it
independently and patents the process and has a claim against the first inventor.
Under Chinese law, the patent holder does not have a claim against the prior user.
Allison & Lin, supra note 57, at 763.
174. This is especially the case because China follows a "first to file" system. Patent
Law of the People's Republic of China, ch. 1, art. 9, available at
http://www.chinaiprlaw.com/english/laws/ laws4.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2004).
175. Keith E. Maskus, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Encouraging
Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Transfer, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 109,
130-31 (1998).
176. A good example is the recent concerns expressed over semiconductor foundry
business expansions into China. See Tom Murphy, Can China l Fabs be Trusted to
Play Fair? ELECTRONIC NEWS, July 9, 2001, available at http://www.findarticles.coml
cf_0/mOEKF/28_47/76495690/pl/ article.jhtml (last visited Mar. 5, 2004).
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confidential.177 Wholly-owned subsidiaries are often used as a control
mechanism to decrease risk of infringement.'78
3. The Investment Decision
U.S. companies tend to choose more hierarchical alliances, such
as equity joint ventures rather than contract-based alliances when
they partner with firms based in countries with weak IP
protections. 9  A cross-national survey study of 174 foreign firms in
China 8' found that the 'joint venture is preferred when perceived
governmental intervention or environmental uncertainty [as with
uncertainty in IP right protections] is high or host country experience
is low," but that a wholly-owned form of entry is chosen "when
intellectual property rights are not well protected, the number of
firms in the industry is growing fast, the need for global integration is
high, or the project is located in an open economic region."'' Some
companies may depart from this general model and use licensing if it
will improve their profitability.'82 On the other hand, if the legal
system is more fortified and it can be relied upon to quickly remedy a
contract-based patent or trade secret violation, then weaker forms of
economic integration are more apt to be chosen.1" This trend in
relation to process technology in a country with a weak IP right
protection system is depicted graphically in the following chart:
177. The renowned example is that of internally protecting Coca Cola's formula
rather than patenting it. Both the ingredients and the process of mixing and
formulating those ingredients are essential elements of duplication.
178. See Dunning, supra note 154, at 1.
179. See Joanne E. Oxley, Institutional Environment and the Mechanisms of
Governance: The Impact of Intellectual Property Protection on the Structure of Inter-
Firm Alliances, 38 J. ECON. BEH. & ORG. 283 (March 1999).
180. See Luo, supra note 147, at 458-60.
181. Id. at 443.
182. See Keith H. Hammonds, Motorola Bets on Its Chips, FAST CO., Mar. 2003, at 42
& 44.
183. This concerns both potential defection of employees and a wholesale breach by
the licensee firm. Either an individual or a firm may misuse knowledge in a manner
that could increase value for a competing company to the detriment of the legal right
holder. However, as IP protections improve, licensing costs, which are partially
derived from more transparent information, should drop because risk declines as it
becomes easier to discipline licensees against misuse of proprietary technology. See
Markusen, supra note 152, at 182-86.
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CHART I
Consider the visual within the context of biotechnology in China.
Foreign biotechnology firms that want to diversify their operations
into China have three general choices. Firms can either integrate
operations into China as a wholly owned enterprise or as an equity
joint venture, license a local firm to use the IP for a fee, or simply
export the product to China. This decision can directly affect risk of
investment, control over operations, and the required investment."
Certainly, the Chinese government's preference is to have the
biotechnology investments very localized so that there is a greater
likelihood that technology will spill over to domestic businesses and
benefit the skill level of the local workforce. For both legal and
political reasons, MNCs have historically used the joint venture
nearly exclusively when diversifying into China.' Joint ventures
have fostered important connections and relationships with Chinese
companies, assisted in dropping R&D costs, provided leverage with
local authorities, and made use of natural resources in China.'86
184. See Jean-Francois Hennart, Can the 'New Forms "of Investment Substitute for
the 'Old Forms?"A Transaction Cost Perspective, 20 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 211 (1989).
185. Cataldo, supra note 74, at 163.
186. Id. at 163-64, 166.
Highest
Technology
Greater Risk of
IP Value Loss
Less Risk of
IP Value Loss
Lowest
Technology
Licencing Joint Venture Subsidiary
Least Integration Greatest Integration
& Hierarchal & Hierarchical
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Several important premises can be reached from the graphic.
First, there is very little concern for protecting IP when the value of
the technology is low. This occurs because the technology can be
reproduced with relatively less expense and effort, or it is older
technology. The risk of loss is then lower and less control is needed
over a foreign market partner even if the host country has weak legal
IP protections. As any given technology abates in value, the product
may no longer require a hierarchical organizational form. Many
foreign companies entering China have taken consolation in the fact
that they have not been transferring their most sophisticated
technology,'87 thus decreasing risk of loss. Hierarchical control,
through a subsidiary or strictly controlled joint-venture expansion,
may be needed to keep a portion of the technology in-house as trade
secret process technology. On the other hand, if patent protection is
available on a given process, there is a relatively high risk that a
process will leak to a competitor if kept in-house as a trade secret, and
since it is not apt to be adequately protected by trade secret law in
China, a patent may be the optimal IP protection device.
Second, the line in the chart is an indicator for a discount factor
when making the investment, which demonstrates that there is a risk
that ROI will be lower relative to the distance above the line. The
distance from the line represents the likelihood that the legal system
will adequately and expeditiously enforce IP rights in the case of
patent infringement. IP rights can be quantified in China by
assuming information about historical levels of enforcement. For
example, one might be able to ascribe a variance for the probability
that protection will occur and how successful it might be, given
different types of economic integration and technology industries.'
A MNC may reduce risks by analyzing the IP right protection
history in the host country for patent versus trade secret protection
187. See generally id. at 166. "[K]eep out of China critical technologies and
production processes that can be pirated." Lieberthal & Lieberthal, supra note 66, at
80.
188. Framing this parameter could include attaining China's patent granting
information on similar products, the ease with which these products could be
replicated when a public disclosure is made by a patent filing versus ease of
replication if trade secret in-house protections are breached, the likelihood of
adequate patent or trade secret enforcement, and the value that can be lost when
enforcement either is slow or inadequate. Points that fall above the line represent
failed protections and the further they fall from the line exhibits a greater risk of
failure and perhaps more of a loss, while those that fall below it can be deemed
successful protections.
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and whether certain industries have been given special protection"' or
are apt to be influenced by international trends.9 Such analysis can
partially elucidate if one type of legal framework for IP rights is more
transparent or more favorable to another. Institutions cannot be
presumed to provide static parameters because IP right violations and
enforcement mechanisms inject foreign legal concepts in the
consideration and because political influences on those rules and
mechanisms are anomalistic across countries."
189. Besides assessing legal institutions, one must consider the extent to which a
country's IP laws have had a track record of effectively protecting various categories
of IP. One can classify across both industries and categories of the locus of IP
protection to assess the extent that a given country is apt to vigorously protect a type
of IP. Some industries may have been granted special legal protection that would be
unexpected without further scrutiny. For example, in many countries chemical and
pharmaceutical industries have been granted more protection than others. See
Charles R. McManis, Intellectual Property and International Mergers and
Acquisitions, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1295-96 (1998). Higher technology products are
more influenced by dissimilarities in IP protection regimes and more standardized
and labor-intensive technologies are rather insensitive to differences.
190. For example, one of the most important industries for the future and one that
has raised serious concerns in China is protection for computer application programs.
Much debate has focused on whether computer programs should be protected by
patent or copyright law, but the general consensus is that the Berne Convention for
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works should protect them. See generally
Paris Act relating to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works of September 9, 1886, concluded at Paris on 24 July 1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 31;
see also Universal Copyright Convention, revised at Paris, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T.
1341. What this has come to mean or how it should be interpreted has led to
substantial dissimilarities in domestic institutional protections. WTO Member
Countries, which are parties to the TRIPS agreement, have been able to interpret
whether the scope of copyright protection for computer programs should be defined
broadly (in the case of traditional literary and artistic works) or narrowly (in the case
of more functional or factual works). A variety of legal standards and interpretations
have ensued. Similarly, the protection of IP on Internet sources will be particularly
vexing as these sources necessarily incorporate information and technology from
"Itlelephone systems, broadcast media, textual media, personal computing, and the
Internet." Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Access to the National Information Infrastructure, 30
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 51, 52-53 (1995). It will continue to pose a myriad of legal
issues, from copyright and data protection to protection of privacy. See also David A.
Rice, Digital Information as Property and Product: U.C.C. Article 2B, 22 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 621 (1997).
191. See Robert M. Sherwood, Human Creativity for Economic Development: Patents
Propel Technology, 33 AKRON L. REV. 351, 358 (1999).
192. Within a country's legal framework,
[tlhe causes and effects of intellectual property piracy are intricately
connected to, and affected by, the economy of the country in which
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The larger the variance and the greater likelihood that points are
located above this line would be indirectly correlated with the degree
that the legal system is fortified with consistent IP rights protections.
Also, larger variances with regard to given forms of economic
integration, technology levels, and industries should produce a larger
discount factor in assessing ROI (to the degree to which process
technology is involved). The variance of risk should decrease as
China's legal system becomes stronger and better protects IP rights.
The number of points located above the line should also decrease
because there would be a parallel shift in the line upward. Logically,
this should give more flexibility to MNCs regarding the form of
investment strategy as derived from risk-adjusted ROI. This is
depicted graphically:
CHART 2
Highest
Technology
Lowest
Technology
Greatest Integration
& Hierarchical
Least Integration
& Hierarchal
The analysis deviates only when product technology is at issue
because there is no available organizational structure that can protect
the piracy is committed, the political history and ideology of the
pirating nation, the culture of the people engaged in the piracy, and
the adequacy of the legal system to enforce its intellectual property
laws.
Tiefenbrun, supra note 12, at 1.
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the IP, such as when a product can easily be reverse engineered. If an
organizational structure cannot reduce the risk of a violation of the IP
rights, then one must rely solely on the legal system and a patent
must be sought. Once a rival firm masters the production of the
product, and it can be duplicated efficiently, that firm will be able to
compete with the IP rights holder until an enforcement action against
the patent-infringing firm occurs. If a legal system is relatively
predictable it would not matter whether the firm is highly integrated
into China or whether the product is being imported, however,
caveats to this assumption will be forthcoming due to the political
dynamics of China.9
D. The Influences of Politics and Culture in China
1. Rational Choice & Guanxi
If leaders have ratified international agreements and have
promised to fortify domestic IP right protection institutions, they are
casting a position to other states and MNCs. These promises form
parameters for acceptable current and future government actions.
Likewise, when leaders frame IP right regulations and interpretive
commentary in domestic law, they make a rational strategic decision
on the degree to which strong legal protections will enhance the
likelihood of receiving new technologies and the extent to which those
rights should be protected. A government that grants reasonable
monopoly rights provides further assurances to the international
system by enforcing those rights, thereby begetting follow-on
investors and derivative technologies within that country. However,
if there is too much flexibility and ambiguity in IP right protection
institutions, political actors may have too much discretion in deciding
whether to grant monopoly rights on an innovation, or on whether to
rapidly enforce IP rights if there is an alleged infringement.'94
193. Patent Law of the People's Republic of China, ch. 1 art. 3, available at
http://www.chinaiprlaw.com/english/laws/laws4.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2004).
194. For example, if there is significant ambiguity in decision making and patents
are leniently granted, the first investors will make initial investments but follow-on
investors in the same industry will be less likely to make investments or they will
withhold more advanced technologies or protect confidential secrets internally to
guard from being exposed to the legal system. Risk of loss for foreign investment has
increased for the first investors. On the other hand, if a more rigid definition of
attaining monopoly IP rights is followed, the first investor is less apt to attain
monopoly rights but may have filed in the foreign jurisdiction and even face the risk
that information contained in the filing could become available to competing firms.
Competing firms could proliferate in this environment. However, if monopoly rights
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As the previous graphics depicted, there is an interrelationship
between objective legal institutions and subjective political influences.
Risk increases in this environment. Political means of control are
often more consistent with cultural norms and can sabotage the
objectivity of enforcement institutions. Collectivism, guanxi relations,
and cultural norms inevitably beget an environment of opportunism
in China.195 Outside relations with local political figures can feed
many of the weaknesses in the judicial system."' Likewise, the more
intrusive and encompassing regulations are on MNCs, which has been
the case with most developing countries, the more important are
political dynamics and the need to effectively manage relationships
with administrative agencies. The Chinese bureaucracy often impairs
expeditious and efficient business endeavors while personal guanxi
relations can accelerate those business dealings.197  Personal
connections with key individuals in emerging market countries are
often more important than the written law.9 8 On the other hand,
when regulations are more objectively defined and enforced, rather
than based on discretions, risks associated with political uncertainty
can be restrained. This is the balance between "rule by law" (law) and
"rule by man" (politics).
have been granted under a rigid definition of IP rights protection, then there could be
a decreased likelihood of follow-on investors because it may be more difficult to
compete with the IP right holding firm.
195. Butterton, supra note 64, at 1113-14.
196. Amnesty International Memorandum to the State Council, supra note 110, at 3-
5. Cited problems include: CCP control over the law, an abstract definition of judicial
power, allegiance of local judges to local interests, a weak system ofjudicial review for
legislative and administrative actions, a lack of independence of individual judges
within their own court, financial funding and human resources, check and balances,
and a code of professional ethics. Id.
197. See Katherine R. Xin & Jone L. Pearce, Guanxi: Connections as Substitutes for
Formal Institutional Support, 39 AcAD. MGMT. J. 1641 (1996).
198. See Yadong Luo, Partner Selection and Venture Success: The Case of Joint
Ventures in China, 8 ORG. Sci. 648 (1997). When IP protection rules are open to
greater interpretive flexibility, such as when standards of justice are derived from
subjectivity and/or sparse legal guidance, political influences can be stronger than
legal influences. While this is changing in many emerging markets and gradually in
China, such reforms are incremental and depend considerably upon the dedication of
monetary resources to support transparent enforcement and the existence of
protective devices that will forbid political influences fi'om seeping into the legal
process. The more that political influences decrease in this process, the more that
legal institutions will become transparent and provide enhanced decision-making
stability for foreign investments.
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Thus far the assumption has been that the risk-symbolizing line
in the previous graphics is apt to be relatively stable, but could shift
slowly over time as legal protections become more fortified. While
legal IP rights will improve in emerging market countries like China
and coincide with higher levels of economic development,'99 legal
protections can still be assisted or hindered by political influences.
Political leaders may eagerly welcome technology even though there is
uncertainty as to whether the legal system can adequately protect
that technology. While the Supreme People's Procuratorate (the
enforcement institution) has made official statements indicating
China's firm dedication to transparently and fairly enforcing the law
for market-based crimes and infringements, 20' there is still much
uncertainty.
As a rational actor, the central government might unofficially
prefer limiting IP right protections on less integrated forms of
organization, such as importation, because freely allowing
technologies to be imitated might assist domestic firms and speed up
economic development as a whole.0 ' Even if the central government
does prefer strict enforcement it has proven difficult because of weak
federalism and the profit motives of local officials." 2 However, a
habitual pattern of non-enforcement would result in foreign firms
199. There is a strong correlation between a higher level of economic development
and stronger IP right protection frameworks. However, foreign investment decisions
are often made by a market's future potential, even when risk of IP right
infringement is very high. Booming economic development and larger populations
often are weighed against risks that might not be as high in poorer countries.
200. See Apparent Full Text of Work Report of Chinese People's Procuratorate, supra
note 108.
201. Under some circumstances, there may be a negative impact resulting from strict
enforcement of IP protection.
To rigorously enforce intellectual property law in such a harsh
condition for state-owned enterprises will drive many of them out of
business and a substantial number of people will lose their jobs.
Therefore, enforcing intellectual property law to protect foreign
interest with little imminent benefit to the domestic economy may
lead to serious consequences: unemployment and social instability.
Chengfei Ding, The Protection for New Plant Varieties of American Businesses in
China After China Enters the WTO, 6 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 333, 348 (2001).
202. "[Tlhe Chinese central government 'simply lacks the authority' to end much of
the piracy in the Chinese economy. IPR regulations mandated by the central
government are often ignored by corrupt local officials who share in the profits from
piracy." La Croix & Konan, supra note 27, at 772 (quoting Robert S. Ross, Enter the
Dragon, FOREIGN POL'Y, Fall 1996, at 18, 24).
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avoiding localization of the most advanced technologies and would
also discourage domestic businesses from innovating. The quality of
transferred technologies does rise with stronger IP rights regimes,...
but directional shifts in improving IP right protection regimes may
not be stable because they are ostensibly influenced by different
political dynamics and preferences.
2. Current Options for MNCs
Given this "rule by law" and "rule by man" trade-off, the foreign
investor has many legitimate ways that it can influence the informal
and political enforcement structures. Such influence may improve the
functioning and adherence to the formal legal system, and thereby
decrease risk. First, international relations and legal agreements
between countries provide leverage in disputes. A high degree of
company/industry influence on the home country government may
make diplomatic pressure a viable option, especially when there are
meaningful dependencies between the countries." ' Nevertheless,
using this technique could actually undermine benefits that can be
fostered by cooperation.
Second, bargaining power and the relationship with the host
government are important factors in making an initial foreign
investment and managing that investment.0 5 However, building
strategic ties with key actors in the investment locale is also
imperative.2 6  Relying on others with more experience and
relationships in China can give a MNC a comparative edge2 7 by
reducing the stigma of being foreign 28 and also may improve the
203. See Sharmila Vishwasrao, Intellectual Property Rights and the Mode of
Technology Transfer, 44 J. DEv. ECON. 381 (1994).
204. Countries have potential recourse at the diplomatic level and domestically for
patent violations abroad. In the U.S., there are unfair trade practice laws such as
Section 301 of Trade Act of 1974. See generally Trade Act of 1974 § 301 (as amended
19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2420 (1994)).
205. See generally Benjamin Gomes-Casseres, Firm Ownership Preferences and Host
Government Restrictions: An Integrated Approach, 21 J. INT'L BUS. STUD. 1 (1990).
206. Judicial favoritism for local interests has been a cited problem. Amnesty
International Memorandum to the State Council, supra note 110.
207. Hiring or developing experts can be critical to penetrating the Chinese system.
Lieberthal & Lieberthal, supra note 66, at 80.
208. Corporate identity should "highlight[] the compatibility between the company's
goals and the country's goals." Id. at 78. See also Yadong Luo & Mike W. Peng,
Learning to Compete in a Transitional Economy: Experience, Environment, and
Performance, 30 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 269 (1999). An advantage of having a more
integrated presence in China is: appeasing the government, particularly because the
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probability of attaining a more objective and fair disposition if an IP
infringement arises."9 Knowledgeable and effective individuals who
will be associated with and represent the firm and government
officials with whom the MNC must later interact are essential. Local
partners and associates may be able to influence government
policies 1° and decrease costs associated with building local market
alliances from the ground up.
If a more integrated form of organizational presence is chosen, a
strategic alliance with a Chinese firm can reduce fixed costs, improve
access to the chain of distribution, and reduce the impact of
protectionist policies. 1' Protecting IP is sometimes easier when a
domestic Chinese business is involved in a joint venture, as opposed
212to protecting investment as a purely foreign company, even though
national treatment is supposed to exist for expeditious handling of IP
CCP has a desire to promote technology investment. See Naigen Zhang, Intellectual
Property Law in China: Basic Policy Developments, 4 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 1,
3 (1997). Another advantage is meeting localization requirements since there is a
compulsory licensing system. Compulsory licensing occurs when a patent owner
refuses to grant a license, but the government deems that it is a public need to have
that patented product worked locally within the country. Patent Law of the People's
Republic of China, ch. 6, art. 48, available at http://www.chinaiprlaw.com
english/laws/laws4.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2004). In other words, there is a valid
patent that the government decides to exploit.
Where any entity which is qualified to exploit the invention or utility
model has made requests for authorization from the patentee of an
invention or utility model to exploit its or his patent on reasonable
terms and such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable
period of time, the patent administrative organ under the State
Council may, upon the application of that entity, grant a compulsory
license to exploit the patent for invention or utility model.
Id.
209. Please note that this is not advocating the use of illegal influence or bribery of
public officials, but instead simply assumes that better relations in China will beget a
more objective and transparent enforcement of the law. In the United States, the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act prohibits such an influence. See Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act of 1977, 18 U.S.C. 1961 (2004). Utilizing relationships in China is
reality and is premised on the same reasoning that foreign businesses use forum
selection clauses in international business contracts. A foreign business does not
want to subject itself to potential discrimination when facing a local business in its
own domestic dispute settlement forum.
210. See Paul W. Beamish & John C. Banks, Equity Joint Ventures and the Theory of
the Multinational Enterprise, 18 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 1 (1987); see also Gomes-
Casseres, supra note 205.
211. FOLSOMETAL., supra note 6, at 152.
212. See Cataldo, supra note 74, at 164.
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right infringements.21 There may also be a sense of national pride
attached to assuring that ownership of certain patent rights remains
in the hands of domestic interests.14 Conversely, IP violators could
have ties to the central or local governments and be harbored from
enforcement actions.215 This occurs either because of the institutional
legacy of a close nexus between government and production"' or
because of local favoritism regarding enforcement for domestically
based businesses. 17 Likewise, local officials could be reluctant to turn
over patent infringers to the Ministry of Security (the PRC's national
police force) due to favoratism.218
Even though administrative enforcement may be tarnished by
local patronage and corruption, 2'9 agency discretion for enforcement
remains significant and could foster disadvantages to a foreign
investment. Extensive administrative control over a FDI may make
IP protection regimes seemingly more fortified and stable because the
government is more involved, but they can lead to adverse and
unexpected results depending on the degree of political leverage or
influence that exists and who yields it. This makes managing
administrative and political relations all the more important.
Preventing potential infringements from occurring is better than idly
waiting for an infringement to happen and using all leverage and
means to strictly enforce the infringement. If IP rights are not
managed proactively, the market and society may even yield
antagonism, be more detrimental to a company in the long run, and
outweigh the cost that might have been assimilated if those IP rights
had been preemptively managed without politicizing the issue.22
213. La Croix & Konan, supra note 27, at 764.
214. See Peter Wonacott, China Tries to Stake its Biotech Claims: Scientists Draft a
Secret List of Products They Want to Keep Out of Foreign Hands, WALL ST. J., Jan.
20, 2003, at All.
215. Assafa Endeshaw, A Critical Assessment of the U.S.-China Conflict on
Intellectual Property, 6 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TEcH. 295, 326 (1996).
216. Id. Governments that were previously statist in nature have had unification
with the private sector, which could arguably make enforcement based less on
consistency and more on relationships. However, if these relationships are fostered
within the context of what is legally expected and acceptable, then the legal system's
beneficial influence should be improved solely within that case.
217. Cataldo, supra note 74, at 164.
218. Allison & Lin, supra note 57, at 781-82.
219. Cheng, supra note 121, at 291.
220. The IP right holder would not want a public spectacle to be made out of its
individual enforcement because there could be a societal backlash, but it might favor
publicizing raids of other infringements because it could deter future infringements.
[Vol. 11:2
INVESTING IN THE DRAGON
In summary, there is a tradeoff between strong and consistent IP
right legal protections and political influences on legal institutions.
As the rule of law is strengthened, the influence of informal and
political relations should decrease. However, the more that informal
channels influence rules and enforcement mechanisms of the formal
legal system, the more that informal or political relations need to be
managed. If those relations can be managed from an early stage in
the investment process, risk of IP value loss should decrease.
E. The Economic Realities of IP Right Violation Enforcement Actions
and 'Value at Risk "
1. National Economic Interest
Even if enforcement institutions seemingly exhibit political will
to forcefully prosecute piracy violations, it remains undetermined
whether it is economically rational to do so from a macroeconomic
perspective. While the last section addressed political influence from
the perspective of leaders' self-interest, this section addresses
enforcement from China's traditional collectivist interest by
considering the issue of economic loss in the R x E = IP Value
formula. If IP right protections primarily benefit foreigners, and the
assumption is that nations will act at least to some degree in their
own self-interest,"' there must be an economic advantage for China to
more stringently enforce the law2 and thwart future piracy. While
the government has enacted and made promises to the international
community that objective and serious enforcement will be
forthcoming, it remains doubtful whether it can necessarily be
The Chinese government would want to publicize raids frequently because it sends a
signal to the international system and MNCs that enforcement actions and raids are
effective and regular; however, too much enforcement could also suggest that the
government lacks societal control since piracy violations could appear habitual.
221. In world politics literature, there has been much debate about whether states
will cooperate in the international system because of an altruistic desire to benefit
the community of nations (absolute gains), or whether states primarily cooperate
because of fostering self-interest (relative gains). See generally Joseph M. Grieco,
Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal
Institutionalism, 42 INT'L ORG. 485, 495 (1988). Given China's need to stimulate
domestic development and provide a higher standard of living for 1.3 billion people
and the existence of potent national pride, it does seem sensible to assume China is
influenced at least to some degree by premises underlying relative gains theory.
222. See generally Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual
Property in China in the Twenty-First Century, 50 AM. U. L. REv. 131 (2000).
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presumed that improvement in enforcement institutions will be based
on the economic value at issue.
Not all agree that stronger patent laws foster economic growth.223
Some have postulated that protecting the interests of MNCs will
undermine China's economic progress and survival.22 '  China's
primary goal in improving IP right protection is to advance science
and technology"5 for the good of society. Therefore, what is best for
the collective interest and consistent with the national development
strategy may prevail over economic interests of individual
companies."s Assuming that IP right protections are motivated by the
desire to advance science, technology, and the country's economic
interests, and IP rights substantive provisions and related
interpretations flow from this encompassing policy, it is rational to
presume that a collectivist and national self-interest might also
influence individual enforcement actions.
Chinese companies have lost market share227 because foreigners
have attained patents on goods that could otherwise be produced by
Chinese interests. Economists have considered the rational likelihood
of international cooperation between the technologically advanced and
the developing economies regarding enforcement of IP rights.
Improving IP protections raises China's cost of technology. 28 As
property rights increase in value, developing countries should not
consummate patent protection treaties. "[Giranting a foreign patent
does not create an incentive for development within the field of the
issued patent because there is less economic incentive for national
companies to develop patented technology" and "national companies
within the developing countries will not be able to secure valuable
223. See David M. Gould & William C. Gruben, The Role of Intellectual Property
Rights in Economic Growth, 48 J. DEV. ECON. 323 (1996).
224. See Catherine Gelb, Patents versus Profits, CHINA Bus. REv., Nov. 1, 2002, at 9,
available at LEXIS, CHBUSR.
225. Patent Law of the People's Republic of China, ch. 1, art. 1, available at
http://www.chinaiprlaw.com/englishlaws/laws4.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2004).
226. The trend being displayed is gradual movement from collective to heightened
individual rights. See supra Part IT.B; see also supra note 61.
227. At a national interest level, if IP intensive imports are taking market share in
China, then economic losses consist of production losses in China and profit margins
attained by companies holding the IP. If Chinese companies lose market share to a
foreign enterprise that is producing a product in China, then the loss to the Chinese
economy is the lost profit margin that could have been attained by Chinese
entrepreneurs.
228. See Elhanan Helpman, Innovation, Imitation, and Intellectual Property Rights,
61 ECONOMETRICA 1247, 1276 (1993).
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patents within foreign countries because of their lack of technological
advancement.2'
2 2 9
In fact, some studies have found that weaker patent protections
can foster economic growth within a country. 30 Consummating a
treaty and codifying heightened standards of protection generally
projects a perception of enhanced property right security, while
weaker and less systematic institutional enforcement measures
provide flexibility to make the most economically rational decision
under the circumstances. Promises and substantive protections shape
international perceptions, but enforcement discretion can be the
escape hatch.
One can perceive how this premise breeds piracy at the
microeconomic level when sufficient deterrents do not exist to curb
individual infringements. Thus, the question of whether piracy occurs
might be viewed in terms of whether a substantial deterrent exists to
prevent would-be infringers from violating IP rights. If the benefits of
piracy outweigh the costs, such as when monetary fines are low or
incarceration is unlikely, IP right infringements are more apt to
occur.2"' Even though the Chinese government regularly enforces IP
right infringements and raids the violating production facilities, many
believe that there are not sufficient penalties and punishments to
deter counterfeiters and reduce recidivism. '32 Even though the law
does potentially provide for civil penalties and potential criminal
229. North, supra note 13, at 132-33.
230. See generally Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex
Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990).
231. Penalties for IP right violations in administrative enforcement actions are left
to the discretion of that agency. Objective standards do not exist. Thus, if someone
were to consider whether to establish an operation that would produce a product that
violates the patent rights of another, there may be no objective and sufficiently harsh
penalty that will forewarn (under the written law) and deter potential infringements.
Thus, if the piracy's expected profits are much higher than a potential (and
indefinite) monetary fine, then IP right violations are more apt to occur. In other
words, calculation of utility equals potential benefits less costs (risk of getting caught
multiplied by expected penalty amount). This differs from other countries, such as
the United States, where stiff penalties for IP violations are available in the written
law. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117a (2004). When criminal court cases in China do arise for
IP right violations, they have had to overcome the insurmountable barrier of
attaining evidence of a sufficiently high level of sales by the counterfeiter. Chow,
supra note 19, at 461. This differs significantly from the levels of proof and use of
inferences available to IP infringement cases in the United States. See id. at 462-63.
232. See id. at 452.
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prosecution for both patent law 3 and trade secret violations,2
uncertainty in judgments and varying penalties235 may not provide
transparent costs to potential infringers.
If there is an economic incentive for pirating to occur because of a
lack of sufficiently high deterrence cost, one can then ask whether
strict enforcement is even the most economically rational action for
the government. Weak penalties may be consistent with a national
interest even though they do not make a statement to would-be
piraters by being ambitious with enforcement actions. However,
providing sufficiently high penalties can foster the movement of new
technologies to foreign countries.3 6
2. Real Economic Loss to the IP-holding MNCs
In the short-run and on an ad hoc basis, piracy may make only a
trivial difference on the financial statements of the company whose
intellectual property was usurped. IP value is added into the cost of a
product and those additional costs do not exist in counterfeit products
because R&D was not spent on the development process. Therefore,
IP-annexed products will have a higher price ceteris paribus than an
IP-infringing substitute. Within any economy, price differentials can
beget varying quantities purchased based on the demand function for
products. This is particularly important in China, since per capita
income could be as low as $912 per year. 37 United States per capita
233. Currently, the law of China says:
The illegal income of the said person shall be confiscated. He may be
coupled with a fine of no more than 3 times of his illegal income and,
where there is no illegal income, he may be imposed a fine of no
more than 50,000 RMB. Where the infringement constitutes a crime,
he shall be prosecuted for his criminal liability.
Patent Law of the People's Republic of China, ch. 7, art. 58, available at
http'//www.chinaiprlaw.com/englis/laws/laws4.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2004).
234. "[T]here is no specific criminal offense attached to the infringement of trade
secrets," but "[iun practice, a number of offenses are used by the Chinese courts to
punish the infringers of trade secrets." Cheng, supra note 121, at 288. Depending on
the actual circumstances, these offenses can include: theft, embezzlement of public
funds, acceptance of bribes by a public official, divulgence of "state secrets", sabotage
of collective production, and counterrevolutionary espionage. See id.
235. See Wang, supra note 54, at 20-23.
236. This assumes that administering enforcement institutions recognize that, in
the aggregate, it is in China's economic interest to rigorously enforce IP rights.
237. While there is much disagreement over accurate per capita income levels in
China, it has been estimated by Chinese economists that approximately $912 per
year is an accurate figure. See Alex Frew McMillan, China Growth Myths Dispelled,
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income could be as much as forty times that of China." Consumer
demand will fluctuate on products with annexed IP value because of
varying income levels and price. 9
Elastic demand for a product24 means that there is a significant
change in the quantity demanded for a product as price changes and
consumers will not buy as much of the product as price increases.
Inelastic demand means that quantity demanded changes less as
price changes24' and consumers are still relatively apt to buy the
product with price increases. IP right enforcement benefits the IP
right holder most when there is relatively inelastic demand for a
product, since consumers are more apt to pay a higher price for the
legitimate product when there are no imitation substitutes. On the
other hand, when there is relatively elastic demand for a product,
larger quantities of a higher priced legitimate product may not be
purchased.242  The phenomenon results because: (1) differential
between the level of elasticity of the demand curve and (2) the
differential between the prices of legitimate and imitation products
determine whether economic value is created when piracy occurs.
Nonetheless, competition within many industries has become
at http://edition.cnn.com/2002/BUSINESS/ asia/10/29/hk.bnpchina/ (last visited Apr.
2, 2004). Other figures have suggested approximately $4,700 is more accurate. See
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK: CHINA (2003), at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ch.html. The distinction in figures
is due to the use of exchange rate versus purchasing power parity measures.
238. The U.S. per capita income is approximately $36,300. See CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK: UNITED STATES (2003), at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/ factbook/geos/us.html#econ (last visited Apr. 2,
2004). This also does not consider distinctions in discretionary income. If
discretionary income as a percentage of per capita income is even lower in China than
in the United States, then this multiple of comparative living standards will be even
higher.
239. See WALTER NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 192-93 (7th ed. 1998).
240. See id. at 189-92.
241. The slope of the elastic demand curve is less than one (i.e. the vertical price
axis change is less than the per unit change on the horizontal quantity axis). For
example, if quantity demanded for a product is 1,000,000 when price for a product is
$50, but only 500,000 when price is $60, there is highly elastic demand. Total sales
revenue drops from $50,000,000 to $30,000,000 with the $10 change in price. The
slope of the inelastic demand curve is greater than one (i.e. the vertical price axis
change is greater than the per unit change of the horizontal quantity axis). For
example, if quantity demanded for a product is 1,000,000 when price for a product is
$50, but 950,000 when price is $60 there is highly inelastic demand. Total sales
revenue increases from $50,000,000 to $57,000,000 with the $10 change in price.
242. See NICHOLSON, supra note 239, at 190.
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increasingly fierce in China. 3 If the profit attributable to IP rights is
already low resulting in only a marginal benefit to the firm holding IP
rights, then elasticity will have less impact in those very competitive
industries.
In the case where IP rights do add significant value to a product,
some have alleged that piracy in China costs foreign interests
"billions, if not tens of billions, of dollars" per year. '" However, if
Chinese consumers cannot afford an original product with inelastic
demand because of the added cost derived from IP, then a very large
percentage of potential consumers will not purchase the legitimate
product anyway. '45 If this is the case, the MNC's losses may be
overestimated. Assuming quality is relatively equal (which in many
cases is an improbable assumption), it is unrealistic to assume that
Chinese consumers will not accept an imitation product, but instead
will opt for an original product when it costs significantly more.
Likewise, economic value to the Chinese economy may decrease
with a crackdown in the short run because the utility246 to the
aggregate of consumers drops when fewer items are sold at the
legitimate product's higher price. The utility to a consumer remains
higher when there is very little differential between the price of a
legitimate and an imitation product. The total costs to society and the
economy is higher when there is a crackdown on the piracy of
products with inelastic demand,24 but the piracy crackdown creates
an impression of improvement in IP enforcement institutions for
future potential MNC investments.
This scenario differs when a foreign firm and a pirating firm are
competitively selling a product in China or on global markets to
relatively profitable firms that can pay the higher price for the good, "
or to government entities in China. If globally competitive companies
can afford to pay for the use of a higher-priced product, such as
particular software products on computers, then there is a tangible
243. Chow, supra note 19, at 451.
244. Ansson, supra note 4, at 4; see also Chow, supra note 19, at 448.
245. Hu, supra note 149, at note 83.
246. "Utility" means well-being/benefit to the consumer. When a consumer acts in
the goods market, he/she will act in a way to maximize utility. See NICHOLSON, supra
note 239, at 667-68.
247. Of course, "utility" would always be higher for consumers when price is lower.
248. Since China entered WTO membership, "pirates have become even more
audacious, making more phony foreign-branded products than ever-and shipping more
of them overseas." Dexter Roberts, Clear Sailing for Pirates: For Now, the WTO Can't
Stop Mainland Counterfeiters, BUS. WK, July 15, 2002, at 53.
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economic loss to the IP holding firm and competing firms that
purchased the legitimate product. This raises the cost of technology.
Paying royalties increases the price of a product and decreases
China's terms of trade. 9 China has reacted to this concern regarding
unfair competition. The Chinese government has enacted a number
of logistical restrictions to encourage firms to use patented software in
their enterprises." °
If a MNC has a fairly integrated presence in China, such as a
production joint-venture with a Chinese firm, there is still likely to be
some loss of aggregate employment in China when piracy is halted,
25
'
but certainly not as much as in the case of where the IP is imported
into China." A more competitive patent violating firm may employ
more workers at the loss of the foreign firm or related entity in China.
Also, lost value by the IP holding firm means loss of revenue and ROI
that would otherwise be expatriated to the parent company or its
affiliates. Theoretically, this can lower R&D expenditures in the
foreign country. If the marginal profit loss from the piracy had
generated profit opportunities, it would also beget a lower profit
margin and firm value. This particular value loss to the holder of the
IP occurs whether or not there is an integrated local presence.
249. La Croix & Kronan, supra note 27, at 767.
250. Recent Chinese laws represent the country's policy to expand IP protection.
[I]n early 1998, the Chinese government established the Patent
Software User Recognition Plan, which was promoted by China's
Electronic Ministry and National Patent Bureau and organized by
the International Commercial Software Association and the China
Software Association. Under the plan, only organizations using
patented software will be granted licenses. China also has
agreements for protecting biotechnological rights and has signed
related agreements establishing procedures for Chinese and foreign
scientists applying for patents in the country. Under the new
agreements, scientists can patent their discoveries in the fields of
microbes and genetic substances. However, the government will not
grant patents for the development of generically engineered or cross-
bred animal and plant species.
Ansson, supra note 4, at 13-14.
251. Loss in employment will likely be higher when there is a larger price
differential between the original good and the counterfeit good since more production
occurs at a higher product demand consistent with lower price, especially when
demand for that good is elastic.
252. If there is no localized presence producing the product in China, then the
employment loss in China will be greater since there is no localized production
coming from the legitimate holder of the IP.
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Varying demand functions and levels of integration distinctions
can impact the real economic value loss from an IP infringement. Of
course, the logical alternative to cope with differentiated demand
functions is to sell a product at different prices in different markets
based on the expected elasticity of demand. Price discrimination
permits a company to meet the optimal demand curve and can
increase the firm's revenue, but it can also cause gray market
trading.253 International sales distributors for products can employ
price arbitrage and sell legitimate products (made in one country and
produced in accordance with IP rights) to distributors and consumers
in another country at discriminatory pricing levels that undercut the
parent company's price in that market."4 Stopping the import of gray
market goods is often not desirable and can be too difficult for
customs to control. On the other hand, if there is an IP violating
product, shipments of those products can be readily confiscated at a
customs house.
This discussion has focused on the rational likelihood of more
stringent IP enforcement in a politically-dominated country premised
strictly on economic considerations and has suggested that the real
economic loss for a current infringement may often be lower than is
usually claimed. Furthermore the most pressing problem for foreign
firms is not so much in the current economic loss that can be
attributed to the drop in sales when there is a much higher price on a
legitimate product over the price of the IP infringing product, but in
the loss of brand loyalty if the infringing product is of lesser quality.
This can have a long-term impact on a company and heightens a
MNC's level of concern. However, this concern is much more difficult
to quantify as a risk.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article established a framework of interacting business
issues relating to legal and political dynamics of China's evolving
patent and trade secret protection regimes. Also discussed were key
253. A gray market good is one that is produced legally, normally because a firm was
granted a license to produce that product domestically, but the product was then sold
in a foreign market. See FOLSOM ETAL., supra note 6, at 736-41.
254. This is the case when products would be readily exchangeable from one market
to another, such as when little adaptation is needed in the product to sell it in a
different country. If adaptation is required, such as foreign language or cultural
changes to the product, then it is not easily adaptable and may not be appealing as a
gray market product.
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concerns involving the risk-adjusted value for an IP-annexed foreign
investment.
China has eagerly consummated international treaties and has
adopted strong domestic protections to attract technological
innovations. For a country historically dominated by informal norms
that define proper societal conduct, it has made incredible progress
over the past two decades in gradually strengthening the rule of law,
but new codifications are often inconsistent with culture and
governance institutions. With inconsistencies between codification
and enforcement, these new regimes have fallen back on political
influences.
A government's decision to fortify IP protection frameworks in
most emerging markets is expected because of the positive economic
utility associated with increased investment to a country, but the
implementation and enforcement of new laws is gradual and subject
to slow consolidation. There can be inconsistent national interests
that limit strict enforcement measures as well as local political
relations that can undermine an objective enforcement process.
Likewise, if enforcement is an expensive and time consuming affair
plagued by political and bureaucratic inefficiencies, the value of IP
can be significantly reduced to the degree of the time-sensitivity of the
technology loss. If the product can be duplicated rapidly and it would
be rational for an economic actor to duplicate it given knowledge that
IP rights and penalties would not be sufficiently harsh, then there is
effectively no deterrent.
A simple formula was proposed that consolidated IP value at risk
with an international investment opportunity. It recognized the
importance of political dynamics inherent in China's gradually
improving enforcement framework and how the form of integration is
very dependent on expectations of enforcement within the domestic
market. Managing risk by choosing the most appropriate form of
investment for the product and process technology and whether to
rely on patent or trade secret protection are imperative issues.
Nevertheless, the value that is truly at risk with any potential
investment should not just consider aggregate projected sales of IP
infringing products to determine lost revenues, but should also
consider economic realities and the political and legal environment
within the context of varying product demand functions. Such
influences make the mode of entry into China very important. To
date, companies have chosen more hierarchical organizational
structures to protect IP rights, prevent leakage of trade secrets, create
a more integrated presence that facilitates developing local
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connections, and arguably establish more predictability regarding the
enforcement process.
After an investment is made, practical management of the
investment should be undertaken. A MNC should have mechanisms
in place that screen the marketplace for IP violating goods. As soon
as an IP right infringement is suspected, a private investigator should
be hired to trace the source of the infringement to decrease the extent
of loss prior to an enforcement action. When the patent or trade
secret infringement is traced to its source, a decision must be made
regarding whether to employ an administrative or judicial process to
remedy the infringement. However, besides deciding between
enforcement mechanisms, a question may also exist regarding the
efficacy of requiring stringent enforcement because of costs related to
potential political and societal backlashes against the MNC. In other
words, a short-term success could result in long-term distress for a
MNC. Strategic decisions must be made on how to enforce and the
optimal degree of enforcement.
China's administrative agencies have "broad de facto and de jure
powers" but there have been unexpected regulations and enforcement
dispositions by agencies." Chinese courts have traditionally been
impotent relative to executive and administrative prerogative,... but
judicial recourse is becoming more fortified in both patent 5 and trade
secret 258 protection cases. Furthermore, Chinese courts are beginning
to be perceived as more objective and neutral institutional
mechanisms for resolving disputes. Administrative agencies may
potentially be influenced more by political dynamics and guanxi.
However, the decision to use a judicial remedy rather than an agency
remedy must consider institutional efficacy, timeliness of
255. See David L. Weller, The Bureaucratic Heavy Hand in China: Legal Means for
Foreign Investors to Challenge Agency Action, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1238, 1238 (1998).
256. "This feature can be attributed to China's historic centrally planned economic
system in which most aspects of the economy were planned, controlled, and
administered by the State." See Chow, supra note 19, at 470. This form of economic
administrative system has been called an activist state, whereby the judiciary was
subordinate or too weak to protect individual rights because the good of the collective,
defined by the state, must prevail. See also DAMASKA, supra note 36, at 17 & 80;
Jerome Alan Cohen, The Chinese Communist Party and 'Judicial Independence '
1949-1959, 82 HARV. L. REv. 967, 972 (1969); Amnesty International Memorandum to
the State Council, supra note 110, at 8-10.
257. See Patent Law of China, supra note 88, art. 57; see also Hill & Evans, supra
note 107, at 372.
258. See Cheng, supra note 121, at 284-88; see also Unfair Competition Law, supra
note 121, art. 29.
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alternatives, and political realities.2" The administrative remedy is
still perceived as the more effective alternative.
IP right protections will continue to improve in China, but it will
take time to reach levels of IP protection that the West desires. In the
interim, because it is important that businesses become established in
this colossal and accelerating marketplace, economic integration and
localization is often desirable, but flexible adjustment to standard
business practices must be recognized.
259. If administrative discretions beget unexpected or seemingly less neutral case
dispositions, an important legal issue is whether there are protections against
administrative abuses. Can the agency be held responsible for the failure to adhere
to the law or to adequately enforce that law? Given differing constructs of separation
of powers between branches of government, a court may be able to theoretically hold
an administrative agency responsible under the law, but whether this is the case in
reality may depend on the strength of this institution relative to the that of the
executive. In most emerging markets, if there are over-lapping jurisdictional
prerogatives between the court (under the law) and administrative agencies (with
more discretion) regarding the question of whether IP rights should be enforced, other
complexities in the balance between law and politics can arise. For instance, if a
court makes an IP right enforcement disposition that undermines the policy of an
administrative body, the agency may not comply with a judicial decision. Appropriate
enforcement mechanisms for court decisions in China are often lacking. See La Croix
& Konan, supra note 27, at 772.
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